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THE WISDOM OF CROWDS? GROUPTHINK AND NONPROFIT
GOVERNANCE
Melanie B. Leslie∗
Abstract
Scandals involving nonprofit boards and conflicts of interest
continue to receive considerable public attention. Earlier this year, for
example, musician Wyclef Jean’s Yele Haiti charity became the target
of intense criticism after the charity disclosed that it had regularly
transacted business with Jean and entities controlled by Jean and other
directors. Although scandals caused by self-dealing undermine public
confidence in the charitable sector, they continue to erupt. Why do
charitable boards sanction transactions with insiders?
This Article argues that much of the blame lies with the law itself.
Because fiduciary duty law is currently structured as a set of fuzzy
standards that focus on outcome rather than procedure, it facilitates
groupthink. Groupthink occurs when directors place allegiance to fellow
board members ahead of the nonprofit’s best interests, and it can
undermine social norms that facilitate sound governance procedures.
Groupthink blinds directors to conflicts of interest and may also induce
directors to refrain from adequately monitoring ongoing business
relationships with board members. When groupthink occurs, boards can
convince themselves that their conduct falls within the law’s murky
limits. As a result, charitable assets are diverted from the charities’
intended beneficiaries and into directors’ pockets.
Social norms against self-dealing are the primary tool for combating
harmful groupthink. The law should be reformulated to support and
reinforce fiduciary duties as social norms. Restructuring laws against
self-dealing as a set of clear rules would give needed direction to
confused boards and would entrench social norms against self-dealing.
A flat prohibition on self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions
would be the most effective way to ensure that fiduciaries place the best
interests of the nonprofit ahead of self-interest. Short of that, clear
directives requiring disclosure of conflicts, investigation of alternatives,
and proof that inside transactions are clearly below market would do
much to counter the damaging impact of groupthink.
∗ Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Sincere thanks to Evelyn
Brody, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Harvey Dale, Marion Fremont-Smith, Myriam Gilles, Julie
Goldschied, Harvey J. Goldschmid, Adam Hirsch, Lance Liebman, Ray Madoff, Dana Brakman
Reiser, Mark Seidenfeld, Stewart Sterk, Charles Yablon, participants in the Benjamin N.
Cardozo Faculty Forum, and the faculties of the Florida State and St. John’s Law Schools for
comments on and criticisms of the ideas presented in this Article. I am deeply indebted to
Lauren Bilasz, Eytan Goldschein, and Leia LaFay for excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 11, 2008, legendary Wall Street trader Bernard L.
Madoff was arrested and accused of operating a Ponzi scheme that
caused losses estimated at more than $50 billion.1 Among his many
victims were important charities and educational institutions, a few of
which lost their entire endowments.2 While some nonprofits had
invested directly with Madoff, others were unaware that money they
had entrusted to other financial advisors and hedge funds had been
funneled to Madoff to invest. For example, Yeshiva University had
invested approximately $15 million with Ascot Partners, an investment
firm run by Ezra Merkin, a prominent financial advisor with an
impressive track record.3 Merkin, who charged Yeshiva an annual
management fee of 1.5%,4 simply handed the funds to Madoff and
reported annual returns ranging between 10% and 15%.5
Yeshiva’s board of directors appears to have been unaware that the
funds were invested with Madoff,6 and the board seems not to have
questioned how Ascot Partners could generate such strong returns
irrespective of market conditions. Although Yeshiva’s board was
certainly not alone in its failure to detect Madoff’s fraud, Yeshiva’s
failure to monitor Ascot Partner’s performance might be attributable to
two unfortunate facts: Merkin sat on Yeshiva’s board of trustees,7 and
was the head of the investment committee, and Madoff was Yeshiva’s
treasurer.8
Why did the Yeshiva trustees engage in a business relationship with
the Chair of the Investment Committee? How did the board fail to
detect Merkin’s abdication of responsibility? Yeshiva’s board’s
behavior, though extreme, is not rare. Many nonprofits regularly engage
in transactions with their directors.9 Although many charities report that
1. Diana B. Henriques & Zachery Kouwe, Prominent Trader Accused of Defrauding
Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A1.
2. See Liz Rappaport, Financier Charged in Madoff Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2009, at
A1; Stephanie Strom, Giant Wall St. Fraud Leaves Charities Reeling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2008, at A1.
3. Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: Where Ezra Merkin Lost His Way, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 10, 2009, at B1.
4. Id.
5. David Segal & Alison Leigh Cowan, Madoffs Shared Much; Question is How Much,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A1.
6. See Rappaport, supra note 2.
7. Javier C. Hernandez, Betrayed by Madoff, Yeshiva U. Adds a Lesson, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2008, at A1.
8. Zweig, supra note 3.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 118–25 (discussing findings in FRANCIE
OSTROWER, THE URBAN INST., NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS ON
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM THE FIRST NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE STUDY
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these deals are on terms that are “below market,” a substantial number
disclose that many deals with directors are no better than the nonprofit
could have obtained by transacting in the marketplace. More troubling,
charities’ determinations that these insider deals are “below market” or
“at market” often turn out to be based on nothing more than board
members’ intuitions or guesses about prevailing market rates. Recently,
for example, musician Wyclef Jean’s Yele Haiti charity became the
target of intense criticism after the revelation that the charity transacted
business with Jean and entities controlled by Jean and other directors. In
one such deal, the charity paid Jean $100,000 to perform at a
fundraiser.10 Although the charity reported that Jean’s fee was
“‘substantially less’ than his market value,”11 evidence suggests it
greatly exceeded both the fee that Jean could realistically command12
and the price the charity would have had to pay to entice a different
musician to perform at the fundraiser.13
(2007), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411479_Nonprofit_Governance.pdf).
In 2009 alone, the country witnessed several notable examples of self-dealing by nonprofit
directors. In April of 2009, for example, a local newspaper reported that Hackensack University
Medical Center’s board routinely engaged in major transactions with board members, often
without the advance approval of the full board. Mary Jo Layton, Hospital’s Influence Reaches
Far; Tangled Web of Power, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Apr. 26, 2009, at A1. In
response to the newspaper article, the hospital hired two major law firms to “review its
governance policies.” Mary Jo Layton, Firms Hired to Review Hospital’s Policies;
Hackensack’s Move in Wake of Influence Peddling Conviction, THE RECORD (Bergen County,
N.J.), Apr. 30, 2009, at L3. On June 11, 2009, the Los Angeles Times reported that Tarzana
Treatment Center Inc., a nonprofit with a $45 million annual budget that provides public health
services, paid unusually high salaries to senior executives and that two of the board members
purchased real estate and leased it back to the nonprofit. Alan Zarembo, Execs Earn Big Money
at Drug Treatment Center; Salaries at a Tarzana Nonprofit Far Exceed Others in the Field,
L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A1. A follow up report by the Center for Public Accountability
estimated that transactions between the nonprofit and directors cost the nonprofit an extra $22
million during the past eleven years. See CTR. FOR PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, SELF DEALING BY
EXECUTIVES AND BOARD MEMBERS OF THE NONPROFIT TARZANA TREATMENT CENTER: REPORT
TO CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL EDMUND G. BROWN JR. 1 (2009), available
at http://accountablecalifornia.org/2009/09/report-self-dealing-by-tarzana.html.
10. See Shelly Banjo, Wyclef Jean Charity to Receive MTV Telethon Funds, Still Under
Scrutiny by Watchdogs, SPEAKEASY, Jan. 22, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2010/01/22/wyclef-jeancharity-to-receive-mtv-telethon-funds-still-under-scrunity-by-watchdogs/.
11. See Wyclef’s Funny Money Part II, THE SMOKING GUN (Jan. 19, 2010),
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/years/2010/0119101wyclef1.html.
12. The peak of Jean’s career occurred in 1996, when he was a member of The Fugees. Id.
Contracts obtained by the website The Smoking Gun reveal that Jean commanded $40,000 to
perform at a festival in 2002 (in a stadium with 10,000 seats). Id. In early 2008, Jean toured with
his band mates in clubs averaging 1,000 seats. Id. It is unlikely that he was paid substantially
more than $100,000 for these performances. Id.
13. The Smoking Gun examined the tax returns of forty charities founded by or closely
affiliated with celebrities, including Leonardo DiCaprio, Justin Timberlake, Angelina Jolie,
Brad Pitt, Will Smith, Bruce Springsteen, Britney Spears, Jay-Z, Madonna, Tiger Woods, Alicia
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When transactions with directors cost the nonprofit even slightly
more than market rates or provide goods or services that the nonprofit
does not truly need, they siphon the nonprofit’s resources away from the
mission and towards insiders. It is all too easy to understand the
motivations of the Madoffs, Merkins, and Jeans, who directly profit
from these transactions. But why do well-intentioned board members,
who do not stand to profit, authorize or participate in these transactions?
At least part of the reason is that nonprofit boards are extraordinarily
vulnerable to “groupthink”14—a phenomenon that occurs when
members of a cohesive group, such as a corporation’s board of
directors, place the desire for group unity ahead of the best interests of
the nonprofit corporation.15 Board members’ preferences for consensus,
approval, and group solidarity can intensify the effect of pre-existing
biases that impede rational decision-making, such as confirmation
bias,16 ingroup bias,17 and overconfidence in one’s ability to act fairly.18
The chances that groupthink will occur increase in the absence of

Keys, Derek Jeter, David Letterman, LeBron James, Jay Leno, Michael J. Fox, Barbra
Streisand, Bill Gates, Sean “Diddy” Combs, Martin Scorsese, Michael Douglas, Steven
Spielberg, Snoop Dogg, Lenny Kravitz, Danny DeVito, Russell Simmons, Dave Matthews,
Richard Gere, Ron Howard, Edward Norton, Jane Fonda, Stevie Nicks, Sharon Stone, Kirk
Douglas, Bruce Willis, Peyton Manning, Kelsey Grammer, David Geffen, Gloria Estefan,
Stephen King, and Tom Brokaw. Id. Not one of these charities ever paid a celebrity for services
rendered, even at a discounted rate. Id.
14. Professor Irving L. Janis appears to have first coined the term in his book Victims of
Groupthink. IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 9 (1972). See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
GOING TO EXTREMES 85 (2009) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES]; Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 85–86 (2000)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?] (explaining how group dynamics can lead to
groupthink, which leads people to adopt positions just because other members of their group
have adopted them).
15. See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias In the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83,
88–91 (1985) (discussing extensive behavioral research studies supporting this point).
16. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998) (defining confirmation bias as “the seeking or
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis
in hand”); J. Edward Russo et al., The Distortion of Information During Decisions, 66 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102, 107–08 (1996) (discussing the results of an
experiment indicating that individuals distort new information to conform to their pre-existing
preferences); David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects of
Confirmatory Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 892, 892–93 (1993).
17. Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 237, 249–53 (2009) (providing a thorough review of the psychological studies
establishing ingroup bias).
18. See Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing
Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS,
LAW, MEDICINE AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 81 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005).
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methodical decision-making procedures19 if the leader exhibits a
“closed” leadership style20 or if decision-makers lack sufficient
information to enable them to arrive at an independent decision.21
The more cohesive the group—that is, the more group members
view group membership as an important component of their identity—
the more fertile the ground for groupthink.22 When groupthink occurs,
group members’ desire to confirm their place in the group may lead
them to presume that the views of the majority or dominant group
members are sound and fair, and they may ignore or fail to seek out
information that contradicts those views. This misplaced loyalty to the
group is often unconscious. The result is that group members may
ignore or minimize the dangers of conflict of interest transactions.
As currently structured, the law governing nonprofit fiduciaries
exacerbates rather than counteracts harmful groupthink. Psychological
studies indicate that an awareness that the decision-maker will be held
accountable for failing to engage in an adequate decision-making
process may correct for certain cognitive biases.23 But the law
governing nonprofit conflict of interest transactions fails to require any
such procedure. State fiduciary duty law that instructs boards how to
handle self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions is vague,
essentially communicating to boards that these problematic transactions
are appropriate if they are “fair.”24 This standard fails to correct for
19. See Christopher P. Neck & Gregory Moorhead, Groupthink Remodeled: The
Importance of Leadership, Time Pressure, and Methodical Decision-Making Procedures, 48 J.
HUM. REL. 537, 549–50 (1995); Philip E. Tetlock et al., Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A
Test of the Groupthink Model, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 403, 404 (1992).
20. Neck & Moorhead, supra note 19, at 550–53.
21. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?, supra note 14, at 82–83.
22. See Michael A. Hogg & Sarah C. Hains, Friendship and Group Identification: A New
Look at the Role of Cohesiveness in Groupthink, 28 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 323, 337 (1998);
Marlene E. Turner et al., Threat, Cohesion, and Group Effectiveness: Testing a Social Identity
Maintenance Perspective on Groupthink, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.781, 789 (1992).
23. See generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999) (thoroughly describing the psychological
research on accountability); see generally also Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social
Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 508–26
(2002) (applying the psychological literature on accountability to determine the impact of
standards of judicial review on agencies).
24. The 1987 version of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act provides that a
conflict of interest transaction is not void or the basis for imposing liability if it is either (1) fair
to the corporation, (2) was approved by a majority of the disinterested directors, or (3) after full
disclosure, a committee of the board and the voting board members “in good faith reasonably
believe[d]” that the transaction was fair. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1987).
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act has been adopted in full or in part by twentythree states. See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY,
GOVERNANCE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
76
(June
2005),
available
at
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board members’ cognitive defects, including the tendency to
overestimate their abilities to act fairly. It allows directors to convince
themselves that they are furthering the charities’ best interests when
they are in fact placing self-interest or the interests of board members
ahead of the nonprofit corporation’s interest. Lack of meaningful
enforcement at the state level further compounds the problem; there is
little case law to give meaning to standards, and directors are often
unsure whether and to what extent particular decisions may have legal
consequences.25
Although the Internal Revenue Code (Code) requires nonprofits to
comply with certain fiduciary duties as a condition of tax-exempt status,
it also exacerbates groupthink. And while the Code creates some
incentives to engage in sound decision-making procedures,26 it too
employs fuzzy standards that fail to correct for cognitive biases.
Consequently, the Code, like state law, enables directors to convince
themselves that questionable decisions are in the nonprofit’s best
interest. Embedded in the Code are three different doctrines addressing
board transactions with interested directors, all articulated in terms at
least as fuzzy as state law.27 The IRS rarely enforces the rules on
dealing with insiders,28 leaving nonprofits with little guidance about
how the IRS might apply code provisions in any particular case.
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/final/Panel_Final_Report.pdf.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. Treasury Regulation § 53.4958-6 directs that a nonprofit can gain the presumption that
an insider transaction was “reasonable” if the transaction is approved by a board entirely made
up of independent directors who make a determination based on comparability data, such as that
obtained through their own research, expert opinions, and actual competing offers, and the board
adequately documents the basis for its determination. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6 (2010).
27. The private benefit doctrine requires charities to abstain from conferring more than an
incidental private benefit on individuals other than insiders. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii) (2006); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39598, 1987 GCM LEXIS 2,
at *13–16 (Jan. 23, 1987); John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV.
1063, 1064–67 (2006). 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) prohibits charities
from engaging in transactions that result in more than incidental “inurement” of charitable funds
to insiders. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(2). I.R.C.
§ 4958(c)(1)(A) imposes penalties on “disqualified person[s]” who engage in “excess benefit”
transactions, and the managers who approve them. The Code defines an “excess benefit
transaction” as
any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable taxexempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified
person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the
consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing
such benefit.
I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2006).
28. Jay Hancock, Nonprofits Seem in No Big Hurry to Fix Their Problems, BALT. SUN,
Mar. 2, 2005, at 1D.
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This Article argues that the law governing fiduciary conduct can and
should be reformulated to counteract groupthink and encourage the
development of sound decision-making procedures with respect to
conflict of interest transactions. Reform should have two goals:
increasing the specter of accountability and clearly communicating
whether and in what circumstances conflict of interest transactions are
justifiable.
Given that we are unlikely to see significant increases in funding to
enable state and federal actors to increase enforcement efforts,
increasing accountability is a serious challenge. This Article argues that
the key to increasing accountability lies in understanding that fiduciary
duties are social norms as well as legal principles. Breach of social
norms generates social sanctions. When group membership is an
important part of a group member’s self-identity, the threat of
reputational sanctions, which may affect status in the group and larger
community, can be a powerful force.29 The key, then, is to reshape the
law so that it strengthens fiduciary duties as social norms. To
accomplish this, the law should move away from fuzzy standards and
towards more “rule-like” articulations. These legal rules should be
simple and procedural in nature to increase the chance that they will
impact the behavior of over-committed and under-resourced board
members. By clearly communicating that self-dealing transactions are
inherently problematic and prohibiting or, at the very least, prescribing
a procedure for responsibly handling them, the law can bolster fiduciary
duties as social norms to benefit all nonprofits.
I. THE PUZZLE OF THE NONPROFIT CORPORATION
The nonprofit corporation presents a puzzle for scholars and policy
makers. Although nonprofits share structural similarities with their forprofit counterparts, such as a board of directors and a chief executive,
the central dilemma for nonprofit law is that nonprofit fiduciaries are
not accountable to a principal.30 In the for-profit context, shareholders
have standing and a financial incentive to sue for egregious breaches of
fiduciary duties. Perhaps more importantly, shareholders can object to
poor management decisions by simply selling their shares. Share price
can therefore serve as a measuring stick for fiduciaries’ performance.
But the nonprofit corporation is largely immune from the market
pressures faced by its for-profit counterpart. By definition, the nonprofit
29. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, 22–27 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006)
(1990). Professor Tom Tyler explains that when an extremely high level of societal investment,
in such activities as policing and monitoring is necessary to induce people to obey the law,
normative values and social relations may be more effective means for inducing compliance. Id.
30. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 458, 465–66
(1996).
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lacks residual stakeholders who will monitor fiduciary performance.31
Donors generally do not have standing to sue for breach of fiduciary
duty.32 Thus, it is often said that nonprofit fiduciaries owe their duties to
the nonprofit itself or to the public at large. Although the attorney
general has standing to enforce the public’s interest, state attorneys
general have neither the resources nor the inclination to focus on
monitoring nonprofit fiduciaries.33 And when they do detect breaches of
fiduciary duty, litigation is rarely the result; instead, attorneys general
often choose to work quietly with the nonprofit to reform its governance
procedures.34 While the motivation is laudable, the result is that other
charities are unaware of what acts can lead to trouble.
The Code also attempts to constrain fiduciary behavior. As a
condition of tax-exempt status, the Code requires 501(c)(3) nonprofits
to ensure that all charitable funds are spent to accomplish the charity’s
mission, instead of enriching insiders—the same concept the state law
duty of loyalty captures.35 But the IRS devotes relatively few resources
to auditing charities’ compliance with these tax code provisions.36
Thus, neither law nor markets put pressure on directors to work
diligently and refrain from authorizing or engaging in conflict of
31. The defining characteristic of the nonprofit corporation is the “nondistribution
constraint”; by adopting the nonprofit form, the corporation agrees that profits shall not be
distributed to equity owners. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89
YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980). The rule protects donors and potential beneficiaries of nonprofit
corporations. Id. at 845; see also Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust
Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 616 (1999) (“Any person served
by the entity has an interest in seeing that it is run properly, but no one person is likely to have
the incentive, the ability, or the information necessary to monitor the charity. Further,
beneficiaries are unlikely to have standing to enforce their rights as beneficiaries.”).
32. Gary, supra note 31.
33. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity
Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 938–39 (2004); see also Gary, supra note 31, at 623 (noting
that even in those states where the attorney general’s office has an active enforcement division,
most enforcement efforts occur in response to complaints by whistleblowers or the press).
34. As Professor Evelyn Brody explains, much (if not most) charity enforcement activity
occurs below the radar screen of court decisions. A case that does go to court might result in no
written or reported opinion, and published decisions occur so sporadically in most jurisdictions
that it is risky to read them as considered state law and policy. More commonly, cases arise and
settle without any public attention. Even when one side or the other seeks publicity, news stories
might serve as the only source of information. Unfortunately, press accounts sometimes
oversimplify (if not contain factual and legal mistakes) and appear only if editors and publishers
deem them newsworthy. Brody, supra note 33, at 942; see also James J. Fishman, Improving
Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 268 (2003) (“[S]tate attorney general offices
have neither the person-power, nor sometimes the will, to monitor nonprofits effectively.”).
35. See supra note 27.
36. See Roger C. Siske & Pamela Baker, Executive Compensation: Strategy, Design and
Implementation: Tax Exempt Organizations Compensation Audits:403(B) and 457(B) and (F),
SK091 A.L.I.–A.B.A. 77, 79 (2005) (stating that the IRS audits fewer than 1% of the 990 Forms
filed each year).
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interest transactions. It is up to boards of directors to police
themselves—to ensure that the nonprofit is run effectively and that
charitable assets go towards the mission and not into the pockets of
insiders. Whether this policing mechanism is effective depends on the
degree to which board members are committed to honoring fiduciary
duties as social norms. When nonprofit boards govern effectively, and a
great many of them do, it is because fiduciaries are morally committed
to abiding by fiduciary duties, regardless of whether the law enforces
them. Directors prevent self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions
that divert assets from the charitable mission because they believe it is
the right thing to do.
Norms and law, however, do not occupy separate, airtight
compartments. Even though fiduciary duty law is not predictably nor
regularly enforced, it can still play a role in helping boards govern. The
law also performs an expressive function. It can communicate norms of
behavior to fiduciaries.37 Unfortunately, the law articulating nonprofit
directors’ fiduciary duties does a poor job of directing how boards
should approach self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions. Most
states simply transplant the standards applicable to for-profit
corporations into nonprofit law. In these states, a transaction with a
board member that is “fair” to the nonprofit is not void and furnishes no
basis for imposing personal liability.38 These statutes presume that a
transaction is “fair” if a majority of disinterested directors approved the
transaction after full disclosure.39 If a transaction so approved is later
challenged, it is unclear whether a reviewing court will apply the
business judgment rule or a higher standard of scrutiny.40 In the end, the
message that state law sends to a nonprofit board is simple, though
problematic: self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions are
allowable if they are “fair.”
37. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2025–26 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Expressive Function] (arguing that the way in
which a legal rule is framed can influence social norms); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1735, 1796–97 (2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1253, 1265–66 (1999); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 54–55 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907, 910 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Social Norms].
38. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31(a) (1987); see also MARION R.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 215, 221–22 (2004).
39. Thirty-five states have adopted this standard. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 38, at 220;
see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 617.0832 (2010). Of the thirty-five states, seven states and the RMNCA
further require that the disinterested directors “reasonably believe that the transaction is fair to
the corporation.” REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (1987); FREMONTSMITH, supra note 38, at 220–21. Still others require that the disinterested board members
approve the self-dealing transaction “in good faith.” See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-128-501
(West 2010).
40. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 38.
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The Code contains several provisions that target self-dealing and
conflicts of interest. As a condition of 501(c)(3) status, and the variety
of tax benefits that come with it, the Code directs that the nonprofit
shall be run for public, as opposed to private, benefit.41 The Code also
prohibits private inurement42 and penalizes boards for approving
“excess benefit” transactions—transactions that grant insiders more
consideration than the insider could receive for the goods or services in
a market transaction.43 Although the Code uses different terminology
than state law, these doctrines communicate the same message: selfdealing transactions are permitted so long as they are “fair.”
II. BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND AGENCY COSTS
A fiduciary’s task is to manage assets for the benefit of the principal,
often in exchange for some agreed-upon compensation. The essence of
the fiduciary arrangement is the fiduciary’s promise to subordinate selfinterest and place the interest of the principal first. Agency costs arise
because of the potential that the agent will act out of self-interest by
shirking, acting negligently, or extracting value from the relationship
that exceeds the agreed-upon compensation amount.44
When fiduciaries act as a group, such as a board of directors, selfinterest can generate agency costs in additional ways. For example,
41. See supra note 27.
42. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) prohibits charities from engaging in transactions that result in
inurement of charitable funds to insiders. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–
1(c)(2).
43. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2006) (imposing penalties on “disqualified persons” who
engage in “excess benefit” transactions and the manager who approves them and defining
“excess benefit transaction” as “any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an
applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified
person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration
(including the performance of services) received for providing such benefit”).
44. Professor Michael C. Jensen and Dean William H. Meckling define agency costs as
“the sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by
the agent, and (3) the residual loss.” Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308
(1976). Jensen and Meckling explain:
If both parties to the [agency] relationship are utility maximizers there is good
reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the
principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing
appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed
to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some situations it will
pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not
take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the
principal will be compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is
generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the
agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.
Id.
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shirking may intensify because over-committed board members may be
tempted to free-ride off the efforts of other directors. Or a director’s
desire to curry favor with another board member may lead her to
acquiesce in the director’s self-dealing behavior. Finally, the social
norms of reciprocity and cooperation that facilitate group functioning
may lead groups to engage in groupthink.45 Although groupthink does
not necessarily lead to poor decisions, it often leads group members to
adopt beliefs that are contrary to fact or make decisions that damage the
principal’s interest, even if none of the individual group members would
have made the decision acting alone. In particular, groupthink often
blinds group fiduciaries to conflicts of interest and related ethical
dilemmas. The following sections explain how groupthink works, and
explore the psychology of group dynamics to illustrate how group
decision-making processes can lead fiduciaries to place the interests of
members of the group ahead of the interest of the principal, creating
serious damage to the principal.
A. Explaining Groupthink
Ideally, group decisions will be qualitatively better than individual
ones because group deliberation will compensate for the bounded
rationality of individual members. Individuals have cognitive
limitations that can impede rational and efficient decision-making, such
as deficits in memory and computation skills, limits on the amount of
information they can process, or overestimation of their own judgment
or abilities.46 People have distinctive areas of expertise and different life
experiences. The diversity of talents and strengths among group
members can compensate for individual weaknesses, producing
decisions that are synergistically better than those any one member of
the group might have made acting alone.47 Corporate law scholars have
used this insight, gleaned from early psychological studies on group
dynamics, to explain why U.S. corporations are governed by boards of
directors.48
45. As Janis explains: “I use the term ‘groupthink’ as a quick and easy way to refer to a
mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group,
when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action.” JANIS, supra note 14.
46. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–31 (2002) (discussing experiments by Shaw, Blinder &
Morgan, Miner, and the Hiltz Group and arguing that their findings are applicable to corporate
boards); Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and
Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (1981) (exploring a variety of behavioral science
studies and concluding that group deliberation has a synergist effect which results in better
decisions than individuals would have made).
47. Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 12–19; Haft, supra note 46.
48. See, e.g., Haft, supra note 46 (exploring a variety of behavioral science studies and
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Yet, more recent psychological research has established that group
dynamics often undermine the advantages traditionally associated with
group decision-making. Group members often value group cohesion and
consensus more than the superior results that the deliberative process is
designed to produce.49 The desire to be a valued member of the group
and the corresponding—and often unconscious—fear of the disapproval
that might result from challenging the predominant view within the
group can lead group members to short circuit the decision-making
process and reflexively follow the lead of the dominant group member
or members.50 Instead of engaging in a thorough decision-making
process involving questioning, open discussion and seeking out and
evaluating conflicting evidence, individuals engage in “groupthink,”
which may lead them to adopt views or concur in decisions that
contradict their independent judgment, experience, intuition, or
perception.51 Groupthink also leads group members to adopt a “quid pro
quo” mentality; the reciprocity norm leads group members to confer
reciprocal benefits on one another.
Individual cognitive limitations facilitate groupthink. For example,
when faced with complicated issues, people exhibit “confirmation
bias.”52 People will seek out information that confirms their beliefs,
interpret neutral information as confirming their beliefs, and will fail to
seek out or ignore information that challenges their instincts.53 In group
concluding that group deliberation has a synergist effect which results in better decisions than
individuals would have made).
49. See supra note 14.
50. Janis explains the studies:
Whenever a [group] member says something that sounds out of line with the
group’s norms, the other members at first increase their communication with
the deviant. Attempts to influence the nonconformist member to revise or tone
down his dissident ideas continue as long as most members of the group feel
hopeful about talking him into changing his mind. But if they fail after repeated
attempts, the amount of communication they direct toward the deviant
decreases markedly. The members begin to exclude him, often quite subtly at
first and later more obviously, in order to restore the unity of the group.
. . . [Experiments show that] the more cohesive the group and the more
relevant the issue to the goals of the group, the greater is the inclination of the
members to reject a nonconformist. Just as the members insulate themselves
from outside critics who threaten to disrupt the unity and esprit de corps of their
group, they take steps, often without being aware of it, to counteract the
disruptive influence of inside critics who are attacking the group’s norms.
JANIS, supra note 14, at 5.
51. Id.
52. See sources cited supra note 16.
53. Page, supra note 17, at 265; see Cox & Munsinger, supra note 15 (discussing
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situations, this editing impulse can lead them to turn a blind eye to
information that challenges the majority view of the group and to absorb
only the information that supports it.
Another documented cognitive limitation many people share is an
overestimation of their own objectivity. Most individuals view
themselves as more fair and moral than other people, and this selfconception causes them unconsciously to favor interpretations of reality
that confirm that view.54 Individual members of a cohesive group may
extend this bias to other group members, adopting a belief that the
abilities and opinions of group members are superior to those of
nongroup members.55 This “ingroup bias” causes group members to
favor other group members in a variety of ways, for instance, in rating
performance, assigning financial benefits, or in a willingness to
advocate on behalf of other group members.56 Ingroup bias is often
automatic and unconscious.57 Studies have shown that individuals easily
form allegiances to groups, and that ingroup bias occurs even when
members share only superficial factors in common, such as the same
birthday or fingerprint type.58 But the more group members have in
common—socially, economically, or otherwise—the stronger the
ingroup bias and the more vulnerable the group is to groupthink.59
In group experiments, this unconscious bias often causes group
members to judge an act that gives an advantage to one group member
as “fair” even when it is not. This tendency blinds group members to the
ethical issues implicit in decisions involving a conflict of interest. In
extensive behavioral research studies supporting this point); see also Charles G. Lord et al.,
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2101–04 (1979) (establishing
that people tend to interpret ambiguous information to confirm their initial point of view).
54. See Chugh et al., supra note 18, at 84. That is, in addition to “bounded rationality,”
group members suffer from “bounded ethicality”: a limited ability to recognize ethical
challenges inherent in a decision involving a conflict of interest. Id. at 75.
55. In a recent article, Professor Antony Page provides a thorough review of the social
psychology literature establishing ingroup bias. See Page, supra note 17.
56. Id. at 249–52.
57. Id. at 249–50.
58. Page summarized several experiments showing that people formed allegiances to
other people even when group membership was based on a coin toss, the same fingerprint type,
the same birthdate, or the final digit of a social security number. See id. at 249 (citing the
following studies: Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and Similarity in
Intergroup Behaviour, 3 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27, 37–48 (1973); Jerry M. Burger et al., What a
Coincidence! The Effects of Incidental Similarity on Compliance, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 35, 35 (2004); John. F. Finch & Robert B. Cialdini, Another Indirect Tactic of
(Self-) Image Management: Boosting, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 222, 228–30
(1989); Henri Tajfel et al., Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior, 1 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 149, 172–77 (1971); Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES
79, 83–86 (1969)).
59. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 15, at 105–08; Page, supra note 17, at 251.
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evaluating conflicts of interest, group members either tend to believe
that the conflict will not affect their judgment60 or they entirely fail to
perceive the conflict at all.61 In fact, instead of appreciating the ethical
and legal issues presented by a conflict of interest transaction, group
members often view the transaction as an opportunity to reward
particular group members for loyalty to the group. Some group
members may even feel obliged to confer such rewards.62 These
findings have led at least one group of researchers to argue that the most
pervasive and dangerous types of ethical breaches are the result of
unconscious behavior.63
Although there is not, as of yet, a fully developed account of or
consensus about why groupthink occurs, psychological studies pinpoint
several factors or variables that can increase the likelihood that
groupthink will transpire. The first, and perhaps most important,
variable is the level of group cohesiveness. A second group of variables
concern decision-making procedures: whether and to what extent
decision-making occurs against a background group norm favoring
thorough decision-making processes, whether group members are
sufficiently informed to enable them to make a particular decision,
whether the group has obtained information about a particular decision
from sources outside the group, and the extent to which group members
feel pressure to make a quick decision. A third variable relates to
leadership. If there is no organizational norm of impartial leadership and
if the leader adopts a “closed” leadership style in a particular instance,
groupthink may result.
First, groupthink occurs when groups exhibit a high level of
cohesiveness. A cohesive group is one where group members view
group membership as an important element of individual identity.64 As
two researchers explain:
[A] cohesive group is one in which the process of selfcategorization has produced, through depersonalization, a
constellation of effects that include intragroup conformity,
intergroup
differentiation,
stereotypic
perception,
ethnocentrism, and positive inter-member attitude. Positive
60. Chugh et al., supra note 18, at 82.
61. Page, supra note 17, at 259.
62. Chugh et al., supra note 18, at 76.
63. See id.
64. Hogg & Hains, supra note 22, at 337. Early critics of Janis’s description of groupthink
conducted studies that cast doubt on whether cohesiveness facilitated groupthink. See Tetlock et
al., supra note 19, at 404 (surveying studies casting doubt on whether cohesiveness is a principal
antecedent to groupthink). Those studies, however, failed to distinguish between friendship and
cohesiveness; in none of those studies was membership in the particular group an important part
of group members’ self-identity.
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inter-member attitude produced thus is social attraction,
wherein group members are liked not as unique individuals
but as embodiments of the group—the more prototypical
they are perceived to be, the more they are liked.65
Cohesiveness should not be confused with friendship:
Depersonalized social attraction can be distinguished from
personal attraction based on idiosyncratic preferences
grounded in personal relationships. . . . Social attraction
. . . is influenced by identification with the group, while
personal attraction is associated with interpersonal
similarity and is influenced by interpersonal relations not
group identification.66
Thus, friendship among group members does not necessarily set the
stage for groupthink. Because people view friends as individuals,
disagreement and discussion between friends may not threaten one
friend’s sense of personal identity. In a cohesive group, however, the
reverse is true: A group member’s desire to be a valued member of the
group and the corresponding fear—often unconscious—of the
disapproval or rejection that might result from challenging the
predominant view within the group can lead a group member to value
group cohesion and consensus more than a deliberative decision-making
process. 67
Factors related to a group’s decision-making process can also tip the
balance toward groupthink. Psychologists suggest that an absence of a
group norm of methodical decision-making procedures can enhance the
possibility of groupthink.68 Vulnerability to groupthink also intensifies
when individual group members lack sufficient knowledge to make an
informed decision. In this instance, the uninformed group members can
be strongly influenced by the views of the majority; if several group
members share an opinion, other members may interpret that fact as
both evidence of the validity of the opinion and as a signal of what the
group expects from them.69 The result can be an “informational
65. Hogg & Hains, supra note 22, at 326 (internal citation omitted).
66. Id.
67. See sources cited supra note 14; see also Neck & Moorhead, supra note 19, at 548
(suggesting that members of cohesive groups are often reluctant to respond honestly to other
members for fear of endangering the group’s sense of solidarity); Turner et al., supra note 22
(announcing study’s conclusion that, “Our overall pattern of data reinforces Janis’s view of
groupthink as a process in which group members attempt to maintain a shared, positive view of
the functioning of the group or as social identity maintenance.” (internal citation omitted)).
68. Neck & Moorhead, supra note 19, at 550 (recounting psychological studies that
support this point).
69. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?, supra note 14, at 83 (citing TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE
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cascade”: a critical mass is reached where even large groups of people
“end up believing something—even if that something is false—simply
because other people seem to believe that it is true.”70 Moreover, the
lack of outside information can intensify the pressure to conform, lead
to a loss of perspective and objectivity, and negatively impact the
quality of the decision.71
Finally, some studies suggest that the leadership style of the group
leader can determine whether groupthink occurs. These studies
distinguish between an “open” leadership style—one that encourages
discussion, dissent, and investigation—with a “closed” style, in which
the group leader telegraphs her position at the outset of deliberations,
discourages views or information that conflict with her position, and
deemphasizes the importance of making a wise decision.72
As Professor Cass Sunstein has recently shown, when groupthink
occurs, group members who are initially inclined toward a particular
view will become more committed to that view after group discussion.73
During discussion, group members hear new arguments that support
their initial inclination, members interpret others’ adoption of the same
view as corroboration of the correctness of the position, and members
may seek validation or admiration for the force of their conviction.74
This process can cause group members to adopt riskier or more cautious
positions than they otherwise would.75
In sum, groupthink can create various defects in the group decisionmaking process that have been shown to lead to poor decision-making:
the group may fail to express dissent,76 ask questions or consider the full
range of alternative options;77 may decline to re-examine the decision
initially preferred by a majority of group members in light of changing
events; make little effort to obtain information by asking questions or

TRUTH, PUBLIC LIES 16–21 (1995)).
70. Id. at 82.
71. Neck & Moorhead, supra note 19, at 548.
72. Id. at 551–53 (using various psychological studies to support this point).
73. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?, supra note 14, at 85; SUNSTEIN, GOING TO
EXTREMES, supra note 14, at 90.
74. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES, supra note 14, at 21–30.
75. Id. at 6–7.
76. See Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Intuition
and Social Psychology Research, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 50–58 (2004) (considering a number
of psychological studies that establish that group decisions are better when group members
express dissent).
77. Studies show that groups that consider multiple alternatives have a greater chance of
arriving at a decision that represents the best course of action. See id. at 42–46 (summarizing the
following psychological studies: Michael Diehl & Wolfgang Stroebe, Productivity Loss in
Brainstorming Groups: Toward the Solution of A Riddle, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
497, 501 (1987); Richard P. McGlynn et al., Brainstorming and Task Performance in Groups
Constrained by Evidence, 93 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 75, 84–85 (2004)).
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consulting experts or outsiders with information;78 and exhibit bias in
their reactions to information, focusing on facts or opinions that confirm
the group’s initial inclination and ignoring those that do not.79 Finally,
groupthink may lead members to spend too little time exploring how
their course of action might later be derailed by opponents, accidents, or
future occurrences.80
B. Fiduciaries and Groupthink
A number of scholars have argued that groupthink is quite
pronounced in the boardrooms of corporate America, and recent
corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, and credit-default swaps
provide strong evidence for their position.81 Boards are generally
extremely cohesive groups82—directors often come from the same
social or economic class and often have personal and business
relationships.83 Moreover, directors have strong incentives to remain
directors; in addition to the paycheck, directorships confer prestige and
increase self-esteem. Directors take pride in belonging to a group of
accomplished and influential people, and directorships increase the
director’s reputation in his larger social community. Behaving in a
confrontational or disruptive manner may threaten a director’s standing
with other board members; moreover, because directors play a role in
nominating other directors, reciprocity norms may dominate, resulting
in a reluctance to challenge powerful directors.84 The desire for
approval and consensus combined with the fear of group censure that
might result from disagreement facilitate a norm of conformity over
78. JANIS, supra note 14, at 12; Fraidin, supra note 76, at 42–46 (discussing this study:
Garold Stasser & Dennis Stewart, Discovery of Hidden Profiles By Decision-Making Groups:
Solving A Problem Versus Making A Judgment, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 426, 432
(1992)).
79. JANIS, supra note 14, at 10. Janis explains that each of these defects may be caused by
other factors, such as fatigue, prejudice, stupidity, or ignorance. Id. at 10–11.
80. Id.
81. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 15, at 105–08. To quote:
[T]he value or strength of the member’s attraction to the group acts as a
multiplier on the directional causes of conformity. This motivational multiplier
creates an even stronger tendency for the individual to conform his personal
goals, opinions, and acts to the goals, norms, and actions of highly valued
groups.
Id. at 92.
82. Id. at 98–99.
83. Indeed, the New York Times reported that a majority of foundations that invested 30%
or more of their endowments with Bernie Madoff had small, homogeneous boards of four or
fewer directors. Stephanie Strom, Study Ties Madoff Loss To Charity’s Board Size, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2009, at B3.
84. Haft, supra note 46, at 12, 19–21.
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dissent.85
Complexity and information asymmetries can compound the
problem. When those factors are present, board members may edit
information by absorbing only those facts and opinions that support the
general consensus. Groupthink may lead to information cascades and
polarization, in particular the “risky shift,” which occurs when directors
make decisions that are far riskier than any of them would have made
acting alone.86 When the CEO chairs the board, the potential for
groupthink increases dramatically.87 Because the CEO is of higher
status (and often has a strong personality) and controls the agenda and
the flow of information, board members are often motivated to support
him, which may generate an information cascade.
Groupthink may have the most pronounced negative effect when
directors consider whether to engage in, or approve of, transactions
involving a conflict of interest between the corporation and a board
member. Recall that people unconsciously believe themselves to be
more fair and objective than they actually are. This tendency, combined
with the effects of ingroup bias, often causes individual group members
to characterize acts that confer a significant benefit on one group
member as “equal” or “fair.”88 Group members are blinded to conflicts
or minimize the dangers inherent in a conflict of interest transaction.
When groupthink occurs, all group members unconsciously concur in
the result, which eliminates the reputational sanctions that might have
been generated by acquiescence in self-dealing behavior. The only
individuals who are aware of the conflict of interest transaction approve
of it. For this reason, several corporate scholars have questioned
whether independent directors are truly capable monitors.89

85. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 15, at 92.
86. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?, supra note 14.
87. Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CINN. L.
REV. 1233, 1245 (2003); see also SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES, supra note 14, at 66 (“Group
polarization occurs because of the informational and reputational signals given by others. When
an authority tells people to do something, both of those signals can be very loud.”).
88. Page, supra note 17, at 249.
89. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 612 (1982) (“In sum, the ambiguity of the standards of fairness,
the difficulty in ascertaining and weighing the relevant facts, the psychological and social
pressure on independent directors, and the limited incentives and weak sanctions available
suggest that to elicit disapproval from outside directors would take a transaction so grossly
overreaching as not often to be proposed by management.”).
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III. NONPROFIT BOARDS AND GROUPTHINK
A. Nonprofit Boards are Uniquely Vulnerable to Groupthink
Several characteristics of the nonprofit board render it uniquely
vulnerable to groupthink. First, nonprofit directors may regard the
board’s role as more supportive than supervisory, and some executive
directors encourage this conception by adopting closed leadership
styles. Second, nonprofit directors are more likely than their for-profit
counterparts to lack information necessary to make sound decisions.
Third, the non-profit sector is characterized by a pronounced lack of
accountability mechanisms. In the for-profit sector, market and
shareholder monitoring—with the ever-present threat of the derivative
suit—creates an accountability mechanism to counter the pull of group
bias. Indeed, scholars who justify corporate law’s relatively relaxed
fiduciary duty rules emphasize the role that market monitoring plays in
disciplining behavior.90 No comparable forces operate in the nonprofit
arena. In addition, neither the positive law nor the entities responsible
for enforcing it create a beneficial accountability mechanism. As a
result, the nonprofit board room is especially fertile ground for
groupthink.
1. Differences in Perception of the Board’s Role
Board members join boards out of some mix of altruism and belief in
the nonprofits’ mission and a desire for the social connections, prestige,
and positive self-image that come with group membership. Similar to
for-profit boards, nonprofit boards are often composed of people from
similar social, professional, or economic backgrounds.91 The same
desire for cooperation and cohesion exist as in the for-profit context, but
nonprofit boards are more vulnerable because board members may be
90. Corporate scholars argue that the market creates significant pressures that minimize
agency costs regardless of whether management is bound by fiduciary duties. Managers’
compensation might be linked to performance. The threat of a takeover of corporate control, the
need to succeed in product markets, and the job market provide additional incentives for
managers to perform in shareholders’ best interests. Moreover, a well-developed information
market helps shareholders monitor management’s performance. If shareholders learn of
managements’ opportunistic behavior, they will exit, causing stock prices to fall. Thus, although
market forces may be inadequate to curb one-shot breaches of the “take the money and run”
sort, for the most part, fiduciaries will tend to minimize agency costs even if the corporate
charter does not require them to do so. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 101–03 (1991).
91. Kathleen Fletcher, Building Diverse Boards, in PERSPECTIVES ON NONPROFIT BOARD
DIVERSITY, 15, 15 (1999 ), available at http://www.transformativegovernance.org/Perspectives
%20on%20Nonprofit%20Board%20Diversity.pdf (“First, new board members are typically
recruited from among the friends, acquaintances, and business associates of those already on the
board. This system, of course, tends to make boards homogeneous.”).
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less likely than for-profit board members to view themselves as
responsible for monitoring the Executive Director (ED).92 Unlike the
members of the for-profit board, who understand that the CEO operates
from self-interest, members of a nonprofit board may (justifiably)
attribute altruistic motivations to the ED. Nonprofit directors are more
likely to view the board as performing a supportive function, with the
goal of assisting the ED in accomplishing the nonprofit’s goals. This
view might be encouraged by the ED, who may view the role of board
members as to fundraise or to lend their name to a cause but may resent
“meddling” by the board in substantive decisions. Because board
members are volunteers, they may be even less inclined to risk angering
other directors or the ED by challenging the prevailing opinion.
As in the corporate context, ingroup bias may cause members to
minimize the risk of self-dealing or conflict of interest transactions. But
this danger is even more pronounced in the nonprofit context; because
nonprofit directors are uncompensated, they may feel somewhat entitled
to engage in transactions from which they receive tangible or intangible
benefits.93 The social ties that often bind members of the board may
lead them to unconsciously minimize the dubious nature of the
transaction. For example, the Boston Globe recently reported that
Suffolk University has a $10,000 per month contract with lobbyist
Robert Crowe’s firm, Wolfblock Public Strategies.94 Robert Crowe is
also a Suffolk University trustee and a member of the compensation
committee that made University President David Sargent the highestpaid university president in 2006.95 When the Boston Globe questioned
Crowe about the apparent conflict of interest, he replied, “To even
92. The Urban Institute’s recent study indicates that boards that focus board recruiting
efforts on friends and acquaintances of current board members did less well with every aspect of
governing except fundraising, where it had no impact. OSTROWER, supra note 9, at 16.
93. As Professor Deborah DeMott explains:
[D]irectors’ motives and incentives for service on nonprofit boards differ
dramatically
from
motives
and
incentives
in
the
for-profit
environment. . . . Board members often join because they believe in an
organization’s mission and contribute to it with financial donations. They
depend heavily on organization management to set the board’s agenda and
provide information to the board. Many large nonprofits also have relatively
large boards. Some actors in this environment reportedly believe that directors
who make financial contributions have a reciprocal entitlement to self-deal.
Indeed the prospect of self-dealing may entice some directors to serve and to
make financial contributions to the organization.
Deborah DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131,
140–41 (1993).
94. Frank Phillips & Peter Schworm, Trustees’ Fiscal Ties Roil Suffolk Conflict-ofInterest Policy Scrutinized, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2008, at B1.
95. Id.
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insinuate there is a conflict is wrong[.] . . . There is no
conflict. . . . Whether or not my public strategy group is paid $10,000 is
not relevant[.] . . . We don't make money on that. We are providing a
service to Suffolk.”96 Another board member, who is also the
beneficiary of a $360,000 contract with Suffolk University, agreed,
calling the notion that there was a conflict of interest “ridiculous.” 97
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. According to Crowe, his firm’s annual $120,000 rate is “half what other lobbying
companies would charge.” Id. Yet, Suffolk University failed to disclose the Wolfblock contract
to the Massachusetts attorney general’s office, in violation of Massachusetts law. Id.
These statements are consistent with a misconception—pronounced in the nonprofit
world—that a transaction with a board member presents a conflict of interest only if it causes
demonstrable harm to the organization. The misconception has given birth to the unfortunate
term “potential conflict,” used to describe actual conflicts that are perceived as beneficial. To
this way of thinking, if the hypothetical director—Smith—offered to lease office space to the
nonprofit on terms purported to be lower than market, Smith would not be operating under an
actual conflict of interest, only a “potential” one. Only if Smith offered space “above market”
would the “potential” conflict transform into an “actual” one. The increasing use of this
terminology further minimizes the dangers of conflicts of interests and leads boards to exercise
less vigilance in evaluating these transactions. A quick Google search of the phrase “potential
conflict of interest” turns up several corporate conflict of interest policies that make the
erroneous distinction between potential and actual conflicts. One example defines conflict of
interest as “any activity that is inconsistent with or opposed to the Corporation’s best interests,
or that gives the appearance of impropriety or divided loyalty.” See, e.g., Apple Inc., Guidelines
Regarding Director Conflicts of Interest, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZ
W50SUQ9OTg5MnxDaGlsZElEPS0xfFR5cGU9Mw==&t=1 (May 27, 2009). Another
declares,
A potential conflict of interest exists when a director, officer, employee,
managing agent, or sales agent of the Society or a member of such person’s
immediate family has a financial or other relationship that might impair the
independence of judgment or adversely influence the decisions or actions of
such person regarding the business of the Society. This includes, but is not
limited to, situations in which such person or their immediate family:
a. derives a material gain such as payment for services, consulting fees,
equity interests, royalties, or other benefits from a relationship with another
person or entity which has or is actively pursuing a relationship with the
Society from which it may receive benefit, or
b. holds a position with a religious, charitable, educational, fraternal or other
benevolent or non-profit organization (including directorships) which has or is
actively pursuing a relationship with the Society from which it will receive
benefit (see also Section 5 “Request for Charitable Grants”), or
c. engages in employment, consulting, directorship or any other professional
relationship, with any competitor or entity that has or is actively pursuing a
relationship with the Society.
Thrivent Financial for Lutherans, Conflict of Interest Resolution, https://www.thrivent.com/mem
bers/news/issues/2009/030109/BOD_Nom_conflict.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). Another
policy instructs,
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In fact, a conflict of interest exists whenever a fiduciary (or an entity or
individual with whom the fiduciary is affiliated) is on both sides of a
transaction—period.98 Transactions involving conflicts of interest are
not always harmful and may be beneficial (for instance, if a director
leases to the nonprofit space that it actually needs on terms clearly
below market rents), but they involve conflicts of interest nonetheless.
2. Greater Information Asymmetries
Information asymmetries can lead board members to defer unduly to
the director who seems most informed (often the ED). In addition,
information deficits are more pronounced in the nonprofit setting. Board
members are volunteers who have careers, families, other professional
commitments, hobbies, and social lives. Even the most well-intentioned
board members may find that conflicting demands on their time result in
inadequate preparation for, or sporadic attendance at, board meetings.99
The need to prioritize among conflicting demands can also cause
directors to adopt the least time-consuming approach to problem
solving.100 Because board members are generally volunteers, there may
be less of a stigma attached to this behavior. This problem creates a
fertile ground for groupthink and, in particular, for information cascades
that can lead groups to approve conflict of interest transactions that are
not in the nonprofit’s best interests.
Conflicts of interest occur when an individual, immediate family member, or
business associate has a material interest in a company, product, or service that
is affected by ASCPT activities in which the individual participates. A conflict
of interest is “real” when an interest, whether economic or not, influences the
individual's actions. “Perceived” conflicts may arise when others believe that
the interest precludes unbiased behavior.
American Society for Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics, ASCPT Conflict of Interest
Policy, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 788, 788 (2007).
98. See MELANIE B. LESLIE & STEWART E. STERK, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 216 (2006).
99. Brody writes, “Nonprofit directors devote even less time and attention to their
positions. Such affirmative board duties as selecting the chief officer, preparing the budget, and
reviewing operations are likely to be carried out haphazardly or by only a few of the board
members.” Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1445–46
(1998). One writer stresses that, “[U]nlike for-profits, the board of many nonprofits consists of
uncompensated volunteers. These volunteer directors are usually very busy people who hold
other full-time jobs and simply do not have as much time to devote to their duties as most inside
directors of for-profits.” David W. Barrett, Note, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability
Standards for Small, Charitable Nonprofit Corporations, 71 IND. L.J. 967, 967 (1996); see also
Harvey Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 633 (1998) (emphasizing that board
members who fail to become involved are “corrosive” to nonprofit corporations).
100. Of those charities responding to the Urban Institute’s study, fewer than half were able
to state that their boards were “very active” at financial oversight and monitoring the boards’
own behavior. OSTROWER, supra note 9, at 13.
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The ED is often the individual who controls the agenda and flow of
information to the board. Because the ED will tend to be someone with
a high degree of expertise and often a magnetic personality, conditions
are ripe for information cascades. When the ED is a voting member of
the board, the problem is compounded.101 In addition, most nonprofit
boards are self-perpetuating, with directors or executives nominating
new members. Appointed directors may feel loyal to those who
appointed them and be less interested in challenging their positions.
3. Lack of Accountability
A significant body of psychological research suggests that a
decision maker’s knowledge that a legitimate authority will hold him
accountable can help correct for many of the cognitive biases that an
individual brings to decision-making.102 There is evidence, however,
that knowledge of an accountability mechanism can actually exacerbate
the confirmation bias—fear of accountability may motivate an
individual to stack the record with evidence supporting his decision.103
If, however, the individual knows that the evaluation of his performance
will focus on the process he used to make a decision rather than the
outcome and if the individual is expressly instructed to consider other
alternatives, confirmation bias can be alleviated.104
In many instances, however, the nonprofit board makes decisions
that will escape scrutiny. In addition, no authority requires the board to
engage in sound decision-making procedures. These facts contribute to
the development of groupthink.
a. Absence of Market Pressures
Finally, few market pressures exist to counter groupthink in the
nonprofit setting. There are no shareholders or beneficiaries with
financial incentive and legal standing to police director behavior. The
directors are not accountable to anyone for the bottom line, nor are they
called upon to defend declining share price or the lack of success of the
nonprofit’s programs. Directorships are generally unpaid, and thus,
there is no job market pressure. Directors need not fear corporate
takeovers.
101. Having the CEO/ED serve as a voting member of the board of directors is negatively
associated with a charity’s adoption of an outside audit, a conflict of interest policy, a document
retention policy, or a whistleblower policy. Id. at 5. It is also negatively associated with the
board’s activity level that is devoted to financial oversight, and positively related to a lack of
good governance factors. Id. at 16.
102. See Mark Seidenfeld, supra note 23 (explaining, in detail, the psychological literature
on the effect of accountability mechanisms on decision-making).
103. Id. at 524.
104. Id. at 517–18, 524.
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In the for-profit context, fiduciaries may also be shareholders, and
that situation may create additional incentives to maximize corporate
value.105 This financial self-interest is absent in the nonprofit context,
where directors are prohibited from being equity holders. As a result,
those directors are unlikely to experience any negative financial
consequences because of the negligent management or conflict of
interest transactions.
The only significant market pressure that a charity may face (and it
can be quite significant) comes from the need to attract capital. Sources
of capital include donations from members of the public, corporate and
foundation grants, and government support. In a few settings, the
market for grants may discipline not-for-profit fiduciaries. Competition
for corporate and private foundation grants is significant, and these
entities often require significant financial disclosure as a condition for
repeat giving. These funders often pay close attention to the charity’s
effectiveness in accomplishing its mission. In New York City, for
example, there are scores of small charities that receive almost all of
their funding from the city government. The greater the percentage of
government and large foundation grants, the more effective the
monitoring.106
But that pressure is insufficient to discipline most charities, who rely
on a diverse array of sources for funding. Donors are generally
ineffective monitors, exerting practically no pressure on board
performance, for several reasons. First, many individuals donate based
on the attractiveness of the cause and the public perception of the
charity’s effectiveness, which can be based largely on marketing efforts.
Second, there is a small, but inadequate, information market at work.
Prospective donors can find the charity’s 990 Form online with little
effort,107 and recent enhancements to the 990 Form require charities to
disclose all transactions that involve a conflict of interest. But
prospective donors cannot determine the effectiveness of board
performance, the charity’s effectiveness in achieving its mission, or
whether conflict of interest transactions are good for the corporation or
are skimming resources away from the charity and into the pockets of
board members.
105. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 90, at 8–10, 91 (noting that in the for profit
context, “The smaller the managers’ share in the enterprise, the more the managers’ interests
diverge from the interests of those who contributed capital.”).
106. The Urban Institute’s study shows that the level of a nonprofit’s reliance on
government funding is positively associated with having an outside audit, a separate audit
committee, a conflict of interest policy, and a whistleblower policy. OSTROWER, supra note 9,
at 6.
107. GuideStar Home Page, http://www2.guidestar.org/Home.aspx (last visited Oct. 9,
2010).
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b. Absence of Legal Pressures
The law does not significantly constrain agency costs in the
nonprofit context because there is little chance that board members will
incur legal liability for authorizing a conflict of interest transaction.108
Boards are not directly monitored by a self-interested principal (such as
a shareholder or beneficiary) with standing to sue for breach of
fiduciary duty. Even if donors detect a breach of fiduciary duty, they
have no standing to sue to enforce those duties but must contact the
attorney general’s office. Even if a donor structures a restricted gift in a
way that gives him standing, he will only be able to enforce the terms of
the restriction, not sue for breach of fiduciary duties more generally.109
The entities that do have standing to enforce the board’s fiduciary
duties (principally state attorneys general and the Internal Revenue
Service) have extraordinarily low rates of enforcement.110 From a
political perspective, an attorney general would prefer to do something
other than pursue a legitimate charity. It takes a major breach to get the
attorney general’s attention. For activity falling short of this, attorneys
general do not sue but often work with the charity to pursue reform.111
In response to this reality, case law has evolved to allow board
members, and occasionally other plaintiffs with a “special interest” in
the charity, to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. Yet, special interest
standing is rarely sought and unpredictably granted.112 Finally, although
board members have standing to sue, endemic institutional bias ensures
that board members sue one another only when collegiality has
completely eroded and directors are openly fighting.
The Internal Revenue Code also contains fiduciary requirements as a
108. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 90, at 7 (“[I]f the anticipated penalty (the
sanction multiplied by the probability of its application) is selected well, there will not be much
wrongdoing.”).
109. Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector
Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 44–45 (“The
modern trend to grant donors standing to enforce the specific terms of their gifts, however, has
not expanded to permit donors to bring suit to redress alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud,
and other misappropriation of charitable funds that do not relate to the donor's gift.”).
110. State attorneys general, representing the public, are the principal monitors of
nonprofits, and in most states, the pressure they bring to bear is minimal. Only a small minority
of states has charitable enforcement bureaus; for those attorneys general, charitable monitoring
competes for resources with all the other things the attorney general must do. In the states that
do have separate bureaus, funding is limited. When determining how to apply limited resources,
attorneys general face competing demands. See Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to be a
Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 559, 598–99 (2005).
111. See Brody, supra note 33, at 948 (“Reform rather than punishment is generally the
goal of the charity regulator.”).
112. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 38, at 328–36 (discussing “special interest”
standing).
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condition for receiving and maintaining 501(c)(3) status. The Code is
chiefly concerned with ensuring that the charity is providing public, not
private, benefits and so seeks to curb the same types of transactions that
the state law fiduciary duty of loyalty addresses.113 But because the IRS
audits 1% of all charitable returns, the threat of legal action creates
minimal pressure to conform to fiduciary duties.114 As a result,
nonprofit board members, who have relatively little time to devote to
governance issues, have little incentive—and even fewer resources—to
devote to determining what exactly the law requires of them.
B. Groupthink in Action: How Groupthink Leads to Self-Dealing
Suppose a charity’s lease has expired, and it needs to find new space.
Smith, who sits on the charity’s board of directors, owns a commercial
building and offers to lease space to the charity for $12,000 per month.
Smith believes that this is a “good deal” for the nonprofit because the
building has a variety of amenities that allow him to command rents at
the top of the market, and he estimates that market rents for
comparably-sized office space in the area range from $8,000 to $12,500
per month. Suppose further that the charity could obtain office space
that would suffice for its purposes for $10,000 per month. The proposed
lease is not in the corporation’s best interest because the charity does
not need all of the amenities that Smith’s building offers and it could
find satisfactory office space for less money. If the charity agrees to the
lease, the additional $2,000 per month that the charity will spend on rent
represents a diversion of charitable assets from the charitable mission to
Smith.
Defects in the charity’s decision-making process, however, may lead
the charity to agree to the lease. First, Smith may simply approach the
ED, or some other executive with power to bind the charity, with his
offer, and the executive may fail to bring the proposal to the board’s
attention (this may be less likely to happen with a major transaction like
a lease agreement but more likely to occur when the goods and services
are less central to the corporation’s functioning). If the ED and the selfdealing board member have a relationship, that bond may induce the
executive to take Smith’s representations about the market at face value
and to believe the transaction is a good one for the charity. She may
also, consciously or unconsciously, wish to reward Smith for board
113. In the past few years, the IRS has strengthened the annual 990 Form to require
corporations to report self-dealing transactions, which sends a clear message to those
corporations that certain transactions are suspect. This may have a desirable effect on boards
and may assist prospective donors in identifying whether the charitable fiduciaries are abusing
their positions. Yet, it is unclear if this will increase legal pressure to conform to fiduciary
standards.
114. See Siske & Baker, supra note 36.
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service. Moreover, self-interest may lead her to accept the lease;
transacting with Smith eliminates the need to devote time to researching
the market, evaluating other possibilities, or engaging in the formal
process of obtaining board approval.
If there is a culture of board disengagement or deferral to the ED, the
board may fail to react when it discovers that the ED has acted
unilaterally. Or, the board may ratify the contract after the fact. Given
what we know about how boards operate, the board would be unlikely
to rescind the transaction unless it is an egregious example of selfdealing (and sometimes, not even then). The pull of ingroup bias will
lead the group to view the contract as beneficial to the nonprofit, and
the tendency to engage in groupthink will prevent board members from
rocking the boat by objecting to the deal after the fact. Thus, a rational
ED may determine that it is cheaper and easier to contract without
advance approval.
Second, the ED may seek approval of the contract from a committee
of the board charged with overseeing financial or business issues,
instead of bringing it to the full governing board. This group will be
smaller, and probably more cohesive, than the board as a whole, which
renders it more vulnerable to groupthink.115 If committee members have
close personal or business ties with Smith, or simply want to curry favor
with him, they are likely to approve the deal. Under the law in most
states, committee approval is sufficient to create a presumption of
fairness.
But even if the ED presents the contract to the full board for
approval, board members may be inclined to authorize it regardless of
whether it represents the best deal for the nonprofit. Board members
may be uninformed about the details of the deal and the market
alternatives, even if those details have been disclosed to the board in
advance of the meeting. Because information deficits set the stage for
groupthink, and information cascades in particular, uninformed
directors may approve this deal if the ED, or other board members, are
in favor of it.
But even when directors have received full disclosure about the
proposed transaction, groupthink may undermine the decision-making
process. Smith and the other board members are likely to characterize
this opportunity as an altruistically motivated gesture on Smith’s part,
and if Smith is a respected or well-liked member of the group, other
directors may hesitate to disrupt the cooperative group spirit by raising
questions or objections to the deal.116 Smith will attend the meeting and
115. See, e.g., Strom, supra note 83 (noting that a majority of groups that lost about a third
of their assets in the Madoff scandal had no more than four board members).
116. As Professor Susan Gary has pointed out, “Given the structure of many charitable
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may even vote in favor of the transaction, greatly increasing the
potential for groupthink.
If groupthink occurs, directors will fail to seek out information from
alternative sources, challenge the representations made by the interested
board member, consider alternatives, consult experts, or generally
engage in an independent evaluation of the transaction. They will also
convince themselves that the deal is a good one; the price may not be
wildly out of line with the directors’ sense of the market, and they will
not be inclined to believe that Smith, whom they like and admire, would
use his fiduciary position to obtain a personal benefit. This attitude may
induce directors to forego market research and other forms of due
diligence and may cause them to edit out information that does not
support their initial inclination. Some directors may feel that Smith is
entitled to the deal since he receives no compensation for serving on the
board. If the ED is in favor of the arrangement, directors may be
reluctant to challenge that viewpoint. In addition, no one with standing
to object to the transaction is likely to find out about it, and on the off
chance a whistle-blower brings it to the attorney general’s attention,
there will likely be no personal liability in most states because the deal
was approved in advance.117 In short, groupthink’s corruption of the
boards and the lack of attentiveness of the directors, disinterested directors may be unlikely to
challenge the interested director’s characterization that the transaction is fair.” Gary, supra note
31, at 614. She argues that, standing alone, “A reasonable belief in fairness does not require a
particular level of scrutiny and does not require that the transaction be the best approach for the
charity.” Id.
117. See, e.g., Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.31(1987). It provides:
Director Conflict of Interest
(a) A conflict of interest transaction is a transaction with the corporation in
which a director of the corporation has a direct or indirect interest. A conflict of
interest transaction is not voidable or the basis for imposing liability on the
director if the transaction was fair at the time it was entered into or is
approved as provided in subsections (b) or (c).
(b) A transaction in which a director of a public benefit or religious corporation
has a conflict of interest may be approved:
(1) in advance by the vote of the board of directors or a committee of
the board if:
(i) the material facts of the transaction and the director’s
interest are disclosed or known to the board or committee
of the board; and
(ii) the directors approving the transaction in good faith
reasonably believe that the transaction is fair to the
corporation; or
(2) before or after it is consummated by obtaining approval of the:
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group decision-making process can push directors to extremes, leading
them to approve deals in which they would not have engaged if acting
on their own behalf.
Evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that the toxic combination
of groupthink and impotent fiduciary duty laws has created nonprofit
subcultures, where self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions are
routine. In addition, there is reason to believe that a significant number
of these transactions are not in nonprofits’ best interests. In 2007, the
Urban Institute’s Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy completed the
most comprehensive study to date on board governance issues, with
more than 5,100 nonprofits across the nation participating.118 Overall,
more than 20% of public charities reported engaging in financial
transactions with board members in the two years preceding the
study.119 If the self-reported figures are accurate, larger charities, which
one might assume would have more professional boards and better legal
counsel, self-deal more frequently than smaller charities. Among those
nonprofits with at least $10 million in annual expenses, 41% reported
transacting with board members in the past two years.120 These figures
underreport the frequency of conflict of interest transactions because
only 50% of respondents had adopted any type of conflict of interest
policy, and 75% stated that they do not require board members to
disclose their financial relationships with entities with which the
nonprofit transacts business.121 Charities may engage in self-dealing
transactions far more frequently than they realize or admit.
Of course, if all of these conflict of interest transactions were for
goods and services at well below market rates, then self-dealing would
not result in diversion of nonprofit assets and there would be no reason
for concern. But 74% of charities that admit to engaging in conflicted
transactions state that they engage in transactions at “market value,”
while only 51% reported that they obtained some goods and services at
below market costs.122 Oddly, nonprofit size is correlated to the
frequency of self-dealing at market transactions but not in the direction
one might expect: 58% of the smallest nonprofits (those with operating
expenses less than $100,000 per year) report that they received goods

(i) attorney general; or
(ii) [describe or name] court in an action in which the
attorney general is joined as a party; . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
118. OSTROWER, supra note 9, at 1.
119. Id. at 8.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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and services at below-market prices, but 85% of charities with more
than $40 million in annual expenses reported engaging in conflict of
interest transactions for market value while only 24% of these charities
also reported engaging in below-market deals.123
Given what we know about group dynamics, there is reason to
question whether the nonprofits were able to assess objectively whether
these deals were really necessary to advance the nonprofit’s agenda and
whether the deals truly are “at market value.” This is especially true of
larger charities, which are less likely to obtain board approval prior to
engaging in self-dealing—only 66% of the largest nonprofits reported
that they obtained board approval for conflict of interest transactions,
which means that significantly fewer individuals are involved in the
decision to make the transactions.124 As the author of the study cautions,
“[I]f anything, the figures are likely to underreport transactions resulting
in obtaining goods at above market value or at market value and
overreport transactions resulting in obtaining goods below market
cost.”125 Because the law does not require directors to establish that a
conflict of interest transaction is the best deal that the nonprofit can
obtain and because groupthink causes directors to edit out information
that does support the group’s initial inclination, it is reasonable to
believe that many of these deals represent transfers of wealth from
nonprofits to directors, ranging from marginal to egregious.
IV. CREATING ACCOUNTABILITY: FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS SOCIAL
NORMS
Because fiduciary duty law is both unclear and underenforced, it
often fails to influence board behavior. One cure might be to devote
more resources to legal enforcement to increase deterrence and clarify
legal standards. But the political will to redirect limited public dollars to
monitoring nonprofits is lacking. Moreover, state attorneys general,
more interested in strengthening charities than destroying them, often
prefer to direct limited government resources toward reforming rather
than prosecuting troubled nonprofits. As a consequence, harnessing the
expressive power of the law to strengthen social norms against shirking,
self-dealing, and conflict of interest transactions126 may be the most
123. Id.
124. Id. at 10. If self-reports are accurate, smaller charities are much more likely than large
ones to obtain advance approval for self-dealing from the board. Ninety percent of the smallest
nonprofits (expenses of $100,000 or less) claimed that they regularly obtained advance approval
for transactions with board members while only 66% of the largest nonprofits (expenses of $40
million annually or more) routinely did so. Id.
125. Id. at 8.
126. Fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are more than legal concepts; they are expressions
of social norms. See Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the
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promising path to controlling agency costs.127
Self-interest is a powerful force. When a fiduciary has not
internalized fiduciary norms, she will (consciously or unconsciously)
weigh the benefits of shirking or self-dealing against the risks of
exposure and the severity of the penalty.128 When nonprofit boards
function effectively, as many do, it is often because the most influential
fiduciaries have internalized fiduciary norms that require them to
subordinate self-interest in favor of the nonprofit’s best interests.129 A
fiduciary who has “internalized” a norm complies with it because she
instinctively feels it is the “right thing to do,” 130 not because she wants
to avoid adverse legal, financial, or social consequences.131 When
dominant directors (or a majority of the board) have internalized
fiduciary norms, other directors, fearing adverse reputational sanctions,
will fall in line.132 If groupthink occurs at all, it will produce decisions
Limits of Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 71–72 (2000); Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 1265–
79.
127. See supra note 29.
128. Sociologists explain that “although norms initially elicit compliance through external
reinforcement, they often are subsequently internalized by individuals: ‘Without internalization,
one obeys the norm to avoid external sanctions made possible by the desire for esteem, though
the sanctions may in fact include material punishments.’” Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms:
Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 157, 167 (2000) (quoting
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Develoment, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338, 381 (1997)).
129. For example, in addition to being a member of Yeshiva University’s board, Ezra
Merkin was also a member of the investment committee of the UJA Federation. But the UJA
never authorized Merkin to invest any of its funds, for two reasons: first, directors adopted a
policy that prohibited the hiring of board members; second, the investment committee would not
engage any financial services professional without first conducting due diligence, which
included obtaining an understanding of the professional’s investment strategy. Asher Meir,
Charities, Financial Institutions and the Public Trust, THE BUSINESS ETHICS CENTER OF
JERUSALEM, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.besr.org/Article.aspx?ArticleID=590. No law required
the Federation to adopt these policies; by all appearances, the board adopted them because they
felt it was the right thing to do.
130. Etzioni, supra note 128 (explaining that norm “[i]nternalization is an element of
socialization whereby the actor learns to follow rules of behavior in situations that arouse
impulses to transgress and there is no external surveillance or sanctions”).
131. Internalized norms are norms so embedded that they prevent an actor from violating
them regardless of the possible benefit that might result from violation. Kaushik Basu, Social
Norms and the Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 476,
477 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Professor and economist Kaushik Basu offers this example:
[M]ost individuals would not consider picking another person’s wallet in a
crowded bus. This they would do not by speculating about the amount the
wallet is likely to contain, the chances of getting caught, the severity of the law
and so on, but because they consider stealing wallets as something that is
simply not done.
Id. at 477; see also TYLER, supra note 29, at 24.
132. See Christine Horne, Collective Benefits, Exchange Interests, and Norm Enforcement,
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that are in the nonprofit’s best interests.
But when dominant fiduciaries have not internalized fiduciary
norms, the stage is set for harmful groupthink. Norms of reciprocation,
cooperation, and group loyalty compete with fiduciary norms, and
reputational sanctions may attach, not for deviating from fiduciary
norms but for objecting to deviation.133 In this situation, self-interest
triumphs over the best interests of the organization.
Groupthink may also cause group members who have internalized
fiduciary norms to discard them. Research shows that if sufficient
numbers of people depart from a norm, a “tipping point” is reached, and
the norm loses its “obligational” force; actors who had internalized the
norm now feel like “chumps” for continuing to abide by it when most
others have ceased to.134 A study released in 2009 by economists Robert
Innes and Arnab Mitra establishes that dishonesty, in particular, is
contagious.135 That is, even someone inclined to be honest will behave
dishonestly if he believes that his peers are dishonest.136 This response
is situational.137 In other words, individuals who are inclined to act
honestly and do so in most situations will act dishonestly if placed in an
environment where they believe most others are acting dishonestly.138
Scholars have advanced various theories to explain the slide from
honest to dishonest behavior. Some argue that the reduced threat of
reputational sanctions in a dishonest environment perpetuates
dishonesty;139 others state that the need for approval creates it140 while

82 SOCIAL FORCES 1037, 1039 (2004). As Sunstein explains, “Norms solve . . . problems by
imposing social sanctions on defectors. When defection violates norms, defectors will probably
feel shame, an important motivational force.” Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 37, at
2029–30; see also Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 1265–79; Hillman, supra note 126, at 72–73.
133. Fiduciary norms cannot operate if there is no social enforcement of them. See Horne,
supra note 132.
134. See Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 1264 (explaining that if a sufficient number of people
believe that others have ceased to follow a particular social norm, there is a “tipping point,” and
the norm loses its obligational character); SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES, supra note 14, at 85–
90 (exploring how group dynamics can change social norms).
135. Robert Innes & Arnab Mitra, Is Dishonesty Contagious? An Experiment 2 (June 26,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1426002 (click “One-Click Download” link; then select “Open” in the pop-up window).
136. Id. at 17.
137. Id. at 29.
138. Id. See generally Jonathon R. B. Halbesleben et al., Everybody Else Is Doing It, So
Why Can’t We? Pluralistic Ignorance and Business Ethics Education, 56 J. BUS. ETHICS 385,
385 (2005) (discussing the implications of pluralistic ignorance in training business ethics and
ethics education).
139. E.g., George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be
One Consequence, 94 Q.J. ECON. 749, 751 (1980).
140. E.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841, 844
(1994).
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others argue that it might be a hardwired response to social cues.141
This research has implications for board behavior. If board members
consistently authorize conflict of interest transactions without
investigation, those directors who had internalized fiduciary norms
might gradually abandon their allegiance to those norms and conform to
group behavior. The result is that fiduciary norms will be supplanted by
norms that favor self-interest at the expense of the corporation.
V. RESTRUCTURING FIDUCIARY DUTY LAW TO SUPPORT
FIDUCIARY NORMS
A. The Advantage of Rules
When critical members of a board have internalized fiduciary norms,
the best interests of the corporation are not in tension with the desire for
consensus and cooperation. In such a case, either groupthink will not
occur or it will lead to results that are in the nonprofit’s best interests.
But how can we ensure that directors will embrace fiduciary norms?
The law can be refashioned to facilitate this objective.142 To harness the
law’s expressive function and facilitate internalization of fiduciary
norms, the law governing board behavior must be simple and
transparent.
Rules are superior to standards for generating and supporting social
norms that counter the pull of self-interest.143 Because standards do not
prescribe clear limits of legal behavior, people who are self-serving will
interpret fuzzy information in ways that benefit them.144 In other words,
they will determine that their behavior fits within the standards of
allowed behavior even if an objective observer might disagree. A
standard requiring drivers to drive at a “reasonable” speed may lead a
driver to conclude that driving 90 miles per hour on a highway meets
the legal standard given his driving prowess and his assessment of road
and traffic conditions. Rules, on the other hand, tend to minimize the
effect of self-serving bias because they communicate more direct
information about the limits of allowed behavior and leave less to the

141. Innes & Mitra, supra note 135, at 29.
142. As Professor Harvey Goldschmid has noted, “[I]n contrast to the for-profit world, the
law plays little role, other than aspirational, in assuring accountability in the nonprofit sector.”
Goldschmid, supra note 99, at 632.
143. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 37, at 55; Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note
37, at 2025–26 (arguing that the way in which a legal rule is framed can influence social norms).
144. See Korobkin, supra note 37, at 46 (citing Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,
37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2101–02 (1979); George Lowenstein et al., SelfServing Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 150–51
(1993); Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV.
1337, 1340 (1995)).
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discretion of the individual actor.145 If faced with a rule limiting the
speed to 70 miles per hour, the same driver would be unlikely to
convince himself that driving 90 miles per hour was within the law.
Some recent empirical scholarship provides evidence that
institutions change behavior in response to the implementation of clear
legal rules. For example, Professors Robert Sitkoff and Max
Schanzenbach have established that institutional trustees significantly
increased the percentage of trust assets invested in equities after trust
law’s traditional “prudent man” rule, which discouraged investments in
equities, was replaced with the “prudent investor rule,” which permitted
trustees to adopt modern portfolio theory.146 Because the prudent man
rule was a default rule, it never prohibited trust investments in stocks—
with the settlor’s consent, the trustee could have created a riskpreferring portfolio.147 For that reason, one might not have expected to
see a dramatic change in trust investment portfolios after the change in
the default rule. Yet, the prudent investor rule’s express embrace of
modern portfolio theory appears to have encouraged trustees to change
their investment practices.148
In another example, a recent experiment by Professors Aleksandra
Gregoric, Katrina Zajc, and Marko Simoneti indicates that even in
countries with poor legal enforcement mechanisms, the promulgation of
clear corporate rules can trigger the social norm of “obeying the law.”149
The authors suggest that “transition” countries’ development of a
corporate code could therefore have an important impact on corporate
behavior, even if the law is unlikely to be efficiently enforced.150
Most importantly, evidence indicates that nonprofit corporations
themselves often change behavior in response to clear directives.
Although states allow self-dealing and conflict of interest transactions
that are “fair,” most flatly bar nonprofits from giving or lending money
to directors.151 In a recent comprehensive national study, fewer than 1%
of the 50,000 nonprofits surveyed admitted loaning money to
directors.152 Clearly, the law has effectively communicated the
prohibition. In addition, a significant number of large nonprofits have
145. Korobkin, supra note 37, at 46.
146. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment
Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J. LAW & ECON. 681, 681–82 (2007).
147. Id. at 687.
148. Id. at 707.
149. Aleksandra Gregoric et al., Agent’s Response to Inefficient Judiciary: Social Norms
and the Law in Transition 14–15 (May 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1403816 (click “One-Click Download” link;
then select “Open” in the pop-up window).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.32 (1987). The majority of states
have substantially similar or identical statutes. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 38, at 226.
152. OSTROWER, supra note 9, at 3.
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voluntarily adopted many of Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s requirements, such
as implementing a yearly independent audit and enacting whistleblower policies, which may be a result of the Act’s relatively clear rulelike articulation of good governance practices.153
In addition, rules are superior tools for combating the groupthink and
ingroup bias that cause directors to subordinate the best interests of the
corporation to the self-interest of board members.154 Besides clarifying
the limits of permissible behavior and making more clear when
contemplated action is a violation,155 rules can provide “cover” for
directors who wish to fulfill their fiduciary obligations but are afraid of
sanctions that might attach as a result of confrontation. In other words,
invigorating fiduciary norms by prescribing clear expectations about
how directors ought to behave reduces the negative reputational
sanction that might attach by behaving that way. Rules that prescribe a
particular procedure also benefit the corporation in a second important
way: questioning by directors is less likely to disrupt group cohesion—
rather than a sign of uncooperative behavior, questioning becomes part
of the decision-making process. Thus, by reducing the “costs of
confrontation,”156 clear procedural rules can replace norms of selfinterest with norms of questioning and debating.
In addition, clear procedural rules can compensate for ingroup bias
by requiring the group to ensure that decisions are not infected by bias.
In other words, rules that require boards to gather sufficient evidence to
support a particular decision can help make directors aware of conflict
of interest situations and compensate for selective editing tendencies.
Of course, legal rules can impact behavior only if actors are
informed of the rules’ content. Thus, rules should be crafted to ensure
that they are easily understood by their intended audience. Complexity
tends to muddy transmissibility. When actors regularly receive expert
legal advice, complexity may be less of a concern. When they do not,
complexity tends to make the law more difficult to understand and, thus,
less effective at norm building. For this reason, rules in the nonprofit
context, where fiduciaries have few material resources and even less
time to devote to mastering applicable law, should be simple to
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 89, at 612 (citing MARVIN E. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS
267–79 (1971); JAMES T. TEDESCHI & SVENN LINDSKOLD, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 561–73 (1976);
Stanley Foster Reed, On the Dynamics of Group Decisionmaking in High Places, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, Winter 1978, at 40, 51–53).
155. As Professor James Fishman states, “If nothing else, explicit standards of care will
provide a clearer guide for conduct and will sensitize board members not only to their
responsibilities but to potential liabilities as well.” James J. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for
Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7 PACE L. REV. 389, 413 (1987).
156. Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 688–89 (2002).
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facilitate the transparency so necessary for effective norm building.
Finally, to compensate for the relative lack of legal enforcement of
fiduciary duties, the consequences of failure to follow legal rules should
be sufficiently serious so as to affect the cost-benefit analysis in which a
director who has failed to internalize fiduciary norms might engage
prior to taking action that hurts the nonprofit. Currently, a fiduciary who
is tempted to place self-interest ahead of the nonprofit’s best interest
might be encouraged to do so by the knowledge that no one is likely to
sue her.
Of course, there are ways to change that calculus; we might direct
additional resources to state attorneys general and the IRS or expand the
standing rules to allow various third parties to sue charities. But
political considerations make it unlikely that states will increase
funding, and broadening standing may not have much impact since
litigants would not be motivated by the possibility of monetary
recovery.157 The next best step is to make the consequences of violating
fiduciary rules quite clear and unpleasant. This approach would have
two advantages: one, it would support fiduciary norms by
communicating the idea that they are important to take seriously; two, it
would bolster the law’s deterrent effect.
B. Restructuring the Duty of Loyalty
When fiduciaries enter into contracts on behalf of the nonprofit
corporation, the goal should be to obtain the best value for the
corporation. To accomplish this, fiduciary duty law addressing selfdealing and conflicts of interest must be reformed to generate and
support a norm that requires directors to subordinate self-interest in
favor of the best interests of the nonprofit. It should correct for the
tendency of groups to ignore or minimize the impact of conflicts of
interest and correct for information asymmetries that exist in the
decision-making process, including information deficits about the
relative value of the conflict of interest transaction. It should seek to
eliminate the negative reaction that active questioning generates and
replace it with a culture where open discussion and airing of differing
perspectives are viewed as desirable. Finally, the law should be
157. Brody argues that broadening standing rules to allow members of the public to sue
charities is a bad idea because members of the public are unlikely to be effective monitors:
The public appears uneducated about the fiscal needs of charities, as many
people express surprise that nonprofit managers are paid at all and reveal
ignorance of charities’ productive demands. . . . A public that does not
understand constraints cannot perform effective oversight. A public whose
oversight focuses on the wrong considerations induces charities to adopt
inefficient and ineffective behaviors.
Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV. 433, 502
(1996).
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refashioned to perform its deterrent function more effectively by
making it clear what behavior will constitute a violation, and penalties
should be designed to deter behavior that places self-interest ahead of
the nonprofit’s best interest.
1. Option One: Prohibiting Self-Dealing
The most effective way to accomplish all of these objectives would
be a simple rule flatly prohibiting self-dealing and transactions
involving a conflict of interest. The rule has the advantage of simplicity,
which increases the chance that it will be communicated to nonprofit
fiduciaries, even those who lack the benefit of legal counsel. Because it
gives clear guidance as to what acts will invite legal trouble, it reduces
the “costs of confrontation”—directors do not need to worry about
undermining group cohesiveness because they will not have to debate
the merits of a self-dealing transaction.158 Combined with a conflict of
interest policy that requires board members to reveal other business
interests, the rule would drastically reduce or eliminate information
asymmetries; board members would need only to know of the conflict;
difficult issues, such as whether the transaction is really the best one for
the corporation or whether the transaction is truly below market, would
no longer be a problem.
Almost thirty years ago, Professor Henry Hansmann suggested that
the best way to protect the donors’ and charities’ intended beneficiaries’
interests was to flatly prohibit business transactions between the
nonprofit and members of boards of directors.159 Hansmann argued that
the absence of legal and market monitoring in the nonprofit context
warranted imposing a rule that would be clear and easy to police, and he
noted that private foundations manage to function with such a ban.160
The wealth of understanding generated during the past thirty years
about group dynamics and how those dynamics play out in the
boardroom bolsters the case for a flat prohibition on self-dealing and
conflict of interest transactions.
But one thing has remained constant: nonprofit advocacy groups,
and many academics,161 strongly object to such a ban. In 2004, the
Senate Finance Committee, citing Hansmann, proposed banning
158. See Stout, supra note 156, at 689.
159. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497,
567–73 (1981).
160. Id. at 569–70.
161. See Brody, supra note 157, at 500 (“[P]eople often make desirable directors because
of their ties to certain businesses and their ability to obtain certain goods or services for the
nonprofit on terms favorable to the nonprofit. Barring such insider transactions would cost the
nonprofit sector dearly.”); Gary, supra note 31, at 635 (“Obtaining help from directors may
enable some nonprofits, in particular small, local nonprofits, to survive. An absolute prohibition
on such transactions seems too drastic.”).
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nonprofits from transacting with board members, among other
reforms.162
Although nonprofit groups praised many of the proposed Act’s
provisions, they were unanimous in their objection to the proposed
ban.163 For example, the CEO of Independent Sector warned that
prohibiting transactions with board members “‘could be extremely
detrimental to a number of charities. . . . Public charities, particularly
smaller charities, frequently receive from board members and other
disqualified parties goods, services, or the use of property at
substantially below market rates.’”164 This objection was echoed by the
National Council of Nonprofit Associations, made up of smaller and
mid-sized nonprofits. Because board members may have a deeper
understanding and ability to value a small or fledgling nonprofit’s
performance, they may offer business deals that are better than those
available to the nonprofit on the wider market.165 For this reason, the
Nonprofit Coordinating Committee of New York warned that the cost
of banning transactions with board members would “vastly exceed the
benefits.”166
162. See STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 108TH CONG., TAX EXEMPT GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS:
STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT 13 (2004), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/0622
04stfdis.pdf [hereinafter STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT] (citing Hansmann, supra note 159, at 569–
73).
163. OSTROWER, supra note 9, at 7.
164. Id. (quoting Letter from Diana Aviv, President and CEO, Indep. Sector, to S. Fin.
Comm., Comments on Discussion Draft on Reforms to Oversight of Charitable Organizations 5
(July 16, 2004), http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/download/?id=406b10f9-a85c44fd-a554-01bfaad147d7 (referring to STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 162)).
165. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 215 (3d ed. 2006).
166. The following is an excerpt from the Nonprofit Coordinating Committee’s written
testimony:
We strongly urge you not to apply the private foundation self-dealing rules to
public charities. Applying to public charities the flat prohibitions of the private
foundation self-dealing rules would be very costly in many circumstances. Here
is a case in which we would expect the costs to vastly exceed the benefits.
Many acts of self-dealing between a public charity and its disqualifying persons
involve transactions that are very favorable to the public charity—such as a
board member renting space to the public charity at a rent well below market.
These transactions should be documented as to their fairness to the nonprofit
and should be prohibited where they are not fair, as is generally the case under
state law. In addition, the “intermediate sanctions” excise tax provisions under
Section 4958 of the Internal Revenue Code already impose serious penalties on
unfair and abusive transactions between public charities and their disqualified
persons, while allowing beneficial transactions to go forward. A simple
prohibition on transactions between public charities and disqualified persons is
too blunt an instrument to wield in this context and would deprive a great many
nonprofits of opportunities to obtain needed goods and services on very
favorable terms.
Letter from Jonathan A. Small, Executive Dir., Nonprofit Coordinating Comm. of N.Y., to S.
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Opponents of a ban on conflict of interest transactions also argue
that engaging in conflict of interest transactions, presumably even atmarket ones, reduces transaction costs for nonprofits and that such a ban
would harm nonprofits operating in small, rural areas, where members
of boards of directors might also be the only professionals to offer
goods and services that the nonprofit needs.167 All of these arguments
lack force.
To begin with, 80% of respondents to the Urban Institute’s study
stated they did not engage in transactions with directors.168 Although
there is reason to question this number,169 it may be safe to say that a
significant number—perhaps a majority—of nonprofits function well
without engaging in insider transactions and would thus not be harmed
by a ban on self-dealing.
Second, banning conflict of interest transactions would not be
detrimental to nonprofits that tend to engage in market value
transactions with board members. As I have established, groupthink
often blinds directors to the real costs of these transactions and
discourages them from doing the leg-work that might reveal that the
transactions are not quite the good deal that they may at first appear to
be. The argument that market value conflict of interest transactions are
beneficial because they save transaction costs is a nonstarter. The
transaction costs saved—pricing the market, finding the best deal for the
nonprofit, sanctioning the deal in advance—are the very costs that we
want the board to incur. Eliminating these costs is what leads a board to
engage—sometimes quite innocently and with the best of intentions—in
deals that waste money or, worse, lead to egregious acts of self-dealing.
The most appealing argument for allowing conflict of interest
transactions is that nonprofits—especially smaller ones—rely on being
able to obtain below-market deals with board members. If the Urban
Institute’s study is accurate and representative, then the claim that the
smallest nonprofits receive significant benefits from transactions
involving board members is a valid one.170 Moreover, 17% of those
nonprofits that report engaging in below-market deals with directors
state that functioning without these transactions would be “very
difficult.”171

Fin. Comm., Comments on Senate Finance Committee Staff Discussion Draft Concerning TaxExempt Organizations (July 14, 2004), http://www.npccny.org/info/gov_rel_071404.htm
(referring to STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 162).
167. OSTROWER, supra note 9, at 7.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id. (establishing that 75% of the nonprofit organizations surveyed did not require
board members to reveal their ties to companies doing business with the nonprofit).
170. Id.
171. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss5/2

40

Leslie: The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance

2010]

GROUPTHINK AND NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE

1219

But, as Hansmann pointed out, nonprofits need not suffer harm if
self-dealing is prohibited because transactions with board members can
be structured to eliminate conflict and ensure that all transactions
advance the nonprofit’s best interests.172 The example he offered was of
the board member willing to extend furnishings on credit to a nonprofit
on more favorable terms than the market because his inside knowledge
of the nonprofit gave him justification for doing so.173 Instead of selfdealing, the board member could act as a guarantor on a transaction
with an independent furniture provider.174 Consider my hypothetical
involving director Smith, who is willing to lease office space to the
nonprofit on favorable terms. Suppose the nonprofit was a very small
one, with annual expenses of less than $100,000, and Smith wanted to
lease office space for the demonstrably below-market price of $2,000
per month. If self-dealing was prohibited, Smith would have two
options for accomplishing that goal without self-dealing. First, he could
donate the space to the nonprofit and take the tax write-off. In the
alternative, Smith could lease the space to a third party at the market
rate, say $4,000 per month, and pledge to deliver $2,000 of the monthly
income to the nonprofit. The nonprofit could then use the money to
offset the $4,000 rent on a comparable space. This arrangement would
eliminate all the valuation problems inherent in allowing self-dealing
transactions and would leave the nonprofit in the same position as it
would have been if it had contracted with Smith directly.
Finally, the Urban Institute’s study indicates concerns that rural
nonprofits would be unable to obtain necessary goods and services if the
law prohibited director transactions are not supported by the facts. The
institute’s author reports, “There was no significant difference between
nonprofits inside and outside metropolitan statistical areas either in the
percentage engaged in financial transactions or in their perceptions of
how difficult it would be for them were such transactions prohibited.”175
It is far from clear that a flat ban on transactions with board
members would create more costs than it would eliminate, and it is hard
to see why larger nonprofits ought to be able to engage in such
transactions. Perhaps nonprofits believe inside deals are important
because transacting with a board member has intangible benefits that
make the transaction more valuable to the nonprofit than a market-based
transaction would be. For example, it may be helpful to have a landlord
who believes in the nonprofit’s mission and is willing to stick with the
organization during unexpected bumps that occur. Perhaps an
accountant or investment advisor who is emotionally committed to the
172.
173.
174.
175.

Hansmann, supra note 159, at 571–72.
Id.
Id. at 572.
OSTROWER, supra note 9, at 8.
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nonprofit’s mission will work harder and give more thought to planning
and advising—for the same price—than an unrelated third party might.
These concerns seem most relevant to small to mid-sized nonprofits,
and may justify creating different duty of loyalty rules for differently
sized nonprofits. Nonprofits with annual expenses below some arbitrary
cut-off point, say $500,000 per year, might be allowed to engage in
demonstrably below-market transactions with directors on the terms
developed in the next section. Nonprofits that grow beyond that size,
which have less need for inside deals and have a greater ability to
structure transactions to avoid conflicts, would be subject to the brightline prohibition.
2. Option Two: Rules that Create Better Procedures
In light of the political opposition to a ban on director transactions,
alternative reforms deserve consideration. In particular, fiduciary duty
law might be reformed to ensure that nonprofits contract with directors
only when the transactions are demonstrably in the nonprofit’s best
interests and clearly superior to the terms the nonprofit could obtain
transacting in the broader market. At the very least, law should change
the incentive structure facing those nonprofits that have not internalized
the loyalty norm. To that end, optional mushy standards should be
replaced with clear, mandatory rules that focus on procedure. The goal
is to correct for directors’ tendencies to minimize conflicts, to counter
groupthink, and to encourage healthy group decision-making processes.
The following sections suggest some key reforms.
a. Require Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest
The psychological literature shows that group members generally,
and boards of directors in particular, are often blind to conflicts of
interest that occur within the group or that they tend to minimize the
costs of conflict of interest transactions. Exacerbating this problem is
the fact that significant numbers of nonprofits do not have conflict of
interest policies and even fewer require directors to disclose their
financial interests, even though IRS and other best practices guidelines
strongly suggest that nonprofits adopt both practices.176 Thus, it is
entirely possible that a significant amount of self-dealing occurs under
the radar—boards may be approving transactions with no knowledge
that they involve a conflict with a board member.
Disclosure of conflicts of interest should be a norm of behavior. Any
revision of fiduciary duty law should include a duty to disclose the fact
176. Only half of the charities that responded to the Urban Institute’s study had adopted
conflict of interest policies, and only 29% of those surveyed required directors to disclose their
financial interests in other entities. Id. at 9.
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that a director has a conflict of interest. A conflicted director’s failure to
disclose a conflict of interest transaction could be grounds for imposing
liability. In addition, following the lead of the better “best practices”
guides, the law could require directors to disclose to the board all
businesses and corporations with which they are affiliated and to
reaffirm and update the form once a year.
b. Advance Approval Requirement
Second, borrowing from trust law, advance approval of a majority of
disinterested directors should be required, not optional as it us under
current law.177 Currently, state and federal law allow nonprofits to
engage in conflict of interest transactions without advance approval by a
majority of independent directors.178 Although both state law and the
177. As I noted in a prior article, trust law has historically required the trustee to obtain
advance approval for conflict of interest transactions:
Almost none of the market forces that pressure corporate fiduciaries to forgo
opportunistic behavior are at play in the trust context. There is no “share price”
or secondary information market that informs other potential customers of a
trust term that reduces fiduciary duties or communicates trustees’ opportunistic
behavior to potential customers. Even if a particular beneficiary discovers that
her trustee is performing poorly, she will be unlikely to communicate this to the
trustee’s other clients, of whom she is unaware. Moreover, that beneficiary
cannot exit if she is dissatisfied.
Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO.
L.J. 67, 82–83 (2005).
[Professor Robert] Sitkoff notes that aftermarkets for beneficiaries’ interests are
weak; moreover, in many trusts, spendthrift clauses prevent beneficiaries from
alienating their interest even involuntarily. Beneficiaries’ only recourse is to
mount a suit for breach of fiduciary duty. Because lawsuits are expensive,
beneficiaries are likely to bring them only in those relatively rare instances
where opportunism can be clearly proven and recovery is likely to be large.
This knowledge of the beneficiaries’ relative lack of options may cause less
than honorable trustees to push the envelope toward opportunistic behavior.
Id. at 83 n.83 (citing Robert Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency,
28 J. CORP. L. 565, 570 (2003)).
In addition, trustees need not worry about raising money, maintaining or
increasing stock prices, or responding to the threat of hostile takeovers.
Although employees of trust companies may be concerned about the labor
market, it pressures them less than it does their corporate counterparts. Because
there is no information market that reveals their poor performance, employees
of trust companies may be less concerned about finding a new job if they are
terminated. . . . When the trustee is an individual professional, the problem is
compounded.
Id. at 83.
178. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 38, at 215, 270.
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Code create incentives to obtain advance approval, failure to do so
generates no negative consequences as long as the deal is “fair” (state
law) or does not exceed market value (the Code).179 Here, we can learn
from trust law, which generally imposes liability on the trustee who
fails to obtain advance approval from a court or the trust beneficiaries
prior to self-dealing.180 The rule forces early disclosure of the conflict,
and it places the burden on the trustee to justify the need for the
transaction, which compensates for the trust beneficiary’s poor ability to
detect self-dealing and to assess whether a proposed transaction is in his
or her best interests.181 The detection and evaluation problems that trust
law seeks to remedy are even more pronounced in the nonprofit context.
A nonprofit’s “beneficiaries” are represented by the attorney general,
who lacks the resources to detect the transaction, and directors have less
incentive than trust beneficiaries to detect the transaction since selfdealing will cause them no personal financial harm. In recognition of
this, California’s nonprofit law has eliminated the corporate law
“fairness” defense, which indicates that the scheme is workable. 182
Finally, requiring advance approval allows the law to work on an
expressive level; it sends a clear message that conflict of interest
transactions are problematic and should not easily be entered into,
which helps counter the tendency to engage in groupthink. To allow the
loyalty norm to take root, failure to obtain advance approval should
expose the parties to the transaction to personal liability and such other
relief as the court deems appropriate, such as disgorgement of profits or
removal of directors. The lack of a “fairness” defense and the threat of
court-imposed penalties will compensate for infrequency of legal
enforcement, creating a true incentive to abide by the law’s
requirements.183
179. Id.
180. See Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to
Professor John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 543 (2005).
181. Id. at 564.
182. California’s statutory scheme creates, in a sense, strict liability for self-dealing
transactions with some limited exceptions, such as the board’s prior approval of a transaction
under specific circumstances that include the following:
Prior to consummating the transaction or any part thereof the board authorized
or approved the transaction in good faith by a vote of a majority of the directors
then in office without counting the vote of the interested director or directors,
and with knowledge of the material facts concerning the transaction and the
director’s interest in the transaction.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233(d) (West 2010). This last requirement represents a major departure
from the Model Nonprofit Corporations Act and the law of other states. By eliminating the
“fairness” defense but creating a safe harbor for directors who follow procedure and substantiate
that the deal is below market, the statute invigorates social norms against self-dealing, creates
strong disincentives to engage in it, reduces the likelihood that social sanctions will result if
directors carefully evaluate the deal, and ensures that the nonprofit that complies with California
law will be in compliance with relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
183. The new IRS Form 990, which requires disclosure of all conflicts between nonprofit
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c. Clear Rule Stating When Boards May Authorize a Conflict of
Interest Transaction
Requiring advance approval will do little to minimize the agency
costs caused by self-dealing if groupthink causes directors to approve
unworthy transactions. Because ingroup bias and groupthink problems
are most pronounced when conflicts of interest arise, advance approval
alone should be insufficient to insulate board members from liability.184
Even in those jurisdictions where board approval must be accompanied
by a reasonable belief in the fairness of the transaction, the law does
little to counter the tsunami-like pull of groupthink.
What is needed is a clear, procedure-focused rule that gives boards
guidance about what transactions are appropriate to approve and levels
a penalty for failing to follow the procedure. A rule requiring a majority
of disinterested directors of the board to establish that the transaction is
in the corporation’s best interest and that the nonprofit is obtaining
goods and services at 20% below market would do much to combat
groupthink.185
More specifically, to satisfy the “best interest” standard, the board
would have to establish that obtaining the good or service was necessary
to advance the nonprofit’s mission. For example, a below-market
contract for architectural services is not in the best interests of the
corporation if the corporation’s offices do not need to be remodeled.
Second, the board should have to prove, with documentary evidence,186
that the transaction was better than the corporation could have received
by transacting in the market.187 Because proving that a deal is “below
and board members, will be helpful. It also sends a strong message to boards that conflict of
interest transactions are problematic.
184. See DeMott, supra note 93, at 143. DeMott suggests that the duty of loyalty rules
should create no safe harbor for approved transactions but that transactions tainted by selfinterest should be voidable unless the transactions’ proponents can establish that the transaction
was fair to the corporation at the time it was entered into. See also Goldschmid, supra note 99,
at 648.
185. Of course, the board must be given full disclosure of (1) the nature and extent of the
conflict of interest and (2) the details of the transaction.
186. See supra note 26.
187. California law takes this approach. That statute provides that in addition to requiring
that the board establish that the deal was in the nonprofit’s best interests, the board must show
that, prior to authorizing the transaction “the board considered and in good faith determined
after reasonable investigation . . . that the corporation could not have obtained a more
advantageous arrangement with reasonable effort under the circumstances.” CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 5233(d)(2)(D)(i) (West 2010). In the alternative, subsection (d)(3) provides the same safe
harbor for transactions approved in compliance with subsection (d)(2)(D) by a committee or
agent of the board if it was not reasonably practicable to obtain approval of the board prior to
entering into the transaction and the board determines that the committee followed correct
procedures and ratifies the transaction at the next meeting. Id. § 5233(d)(3). I would argue that
this provision is not an adequate cure for groupthink and should not be adopted.
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market” can be quite difficult at the margins, it might be beneficial to
pick an arbitrary requirement, such as 20% below market, as the legal
rule. A bright-line rule would send a clearer message that claims of
below-market deals must be substantiated and could become a norm in
the industry. The rule would force board members to conduct research
and compile a record that substantiates the conclusion that the deal was
in fact the requisite percentage below market. Perhaps most importantly,
this requirement reduces the “costs of confrontation”; in other words,
board members who want to probe and question can explain that the law
gives them no choice. A board meeting this rule could also rest assured
that it was in compliance with the various provisions of the tax code
addressing self-dealing and conflicts of interest.
d. Bar Interested Director(s) from Participating in Debate or
Voting to Approve a Conflicted Transaction
Of course, directors with an interest in the transaction should attend
the meeting to present facts and take questions. But allowing an
interested director or directors to be involved in the approval process
practically guarantees that groupthink and information cascades will
occur. Directors may fear that questions may be interpreted as
challenges to the interested director’s motives or integrity. Barring the
director from participation would make it easier for group members to
objectively analyze the transaction. It would also reinforce the loyalty
norm by emphasizing the importance of engaging in independent
discussion.
e. “Strict Liability” for Violating Conflict of Interest Rules to
Compensate for Lack of Enforcement
Given political constraints, it is unlikely that the federal or state
governments are going to increase funding for charitable enforcement
any time soon. To compensate for the lack of enforcement, there should
be no defense to violations of the above requirements. Instead, the court
may impose remedies and penalties that it deems just and appropriate,
including, but not limited to, voiding the transaction, requiring
disgorgement of profits from the interested director, payment of
damages by the interested director and/or other board members, or
removal of directors. To ensure that the rules are perceived as
mandatory, that a board member acted in good faith should not be an
affirmative defense to liability (although there is nothing to stop a court
from taking it into account in fashioning remedies). Again, this
approach is similar to that taken by California, and thus, it is not a
stretch to imagine that it is workable. 188
188. See supra note 182. Subsection (h) of § 5233 provides:
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f. A Word About Diversity
By now it should be clear that nonprofits with diverse boards will be
better equipped to resist the pull of groupthink and engage in healthy
decision-making procedures. And in fact, diversity is positively
associated with whether a nonprofit conducts an outside audit, has a
separate audit committee, a conflict of interest policy, and a whistle
blower policy.189 Any legal rule requiring board diversity would be
difficult to implement and enforce, and would suffer from the fuzziness
problems that this Article criticizes. Nonetheless, any nonprofit serious
about implementing good governance procedures would do well to keep
diversity in mind when selecting board members.
CONCLUSION
When nonprofit directors consider whether to approve a transaction
involving a conflict of interest, directors may—consciously or
unconsciously—conclude that a detrimental transaction is good for the
nonprofit. Decades of psychological research about group dynamics
teach us that groupthink can cause directors to place allegiance to fellow
board members ahead of the nonprofit’s best interests. Groupthink may
also induce directors to refrain from adequately monitoring ongoing
business relationships with board members, which may end up costing
nonprofits more in the long run. As a result, nonprofits’ conflict of
interest transactions often divert charitable assets away from the
charities’ intended beneficiaries and into directors’ pockets.
If a self-dealing transaction has taken place, the interested director or directors
shall do such things and pay such damages as in the discretion of the court will
provide an equitable and fair remedy to the corporation, taking into account any
benefit received by the corporation and whether the interested director or
directors acted in good faith and with intent to further the best interest of the
corporation. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the court may
order the director to do any or all of the following:
(1) Account for any profits made from such transaction . . . ;
(2) Pay the corporation the value of the use of any of its
property used in such transaction; and
(3) Return or replace any property lost to the corporation as a
result of such transaction . . . or account for any proceeds of
sale of such property, and pay the proceeds to the corporation
together with interest at the legal rate. The court may award
prejudgment interest to the extent allowed in Section 3287 or
3288 of the Civil Code. In addition, the Court may, in its
discretion, grant exemplary damages for a fraudulent or
malicious violation of this section.
Id. § 5233(h)(1)–(3).
189. OSTROWER, supra note 9, at 5–6.
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Social norms that require directors to place the interests of the
organization ahead of self-interest are the most effective weapons
against groupthink. As currently structured, fiduciary duty law does
nothing to plant or support those norms in environments where
fiduciaries have failed to internalize them. Comprised of fuzzy
standards that appear to sanction self-dealing that is “fair” or “not
excessive,” fiduciary duty law facilitates, rather than fights, groupthink
that undermines the nonprofit’s best interests.
The law should be restructured to support desirable social norms.
Restructuring the state law fiduciary duty of loyalty as a set of clear
rules would best accomplish this goal. A flat prohibition on self-dealing
and conflict of interest transactions would be the most effective way to
ensure that fiduciaries place the best interests of the nonprofit ahead of
self-interest. The rule would be unlikely to hurt nonprofits because
board members who wish to help can structure transactions to avoid
conflict. Short of that, clear rules that require investigation of
alternatives, deliberation, and proof that inside transactions are clearly
below market would do much to counter the damaging impact of
groupthink.
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